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Zerkle: I Never Forget a Face: New Jersey Sets the Standard in Eyewitnes

I NEVER FORGET A FACE: NEW JERSEY SETS
THE STANDARD IN EYEWITNESS
IDENTIFICATION REFORM
I. INTRODUCTION
Employed at age seventeen with no criminal background, Marlon
was a productive member of his local high school, studying to be an
electrical sound engineer through an apprentice program.1 But any
dreams and aspirations were shattered when he was identified at a
“show-up” identification on March 25, 2011.2 On that evening, Marlon
was wearing a bright orange vest and waiting for the Green Line Train, a
part of the Chicago Transit Authority’s train system, with his friend
Jonas after picking up his paycheck. At this moment, Marlon found
himself at “the wrong place at the wrong time.”
After riding on the Blue Line in the same train car as a group of other
African American and Hispanic individuals, Marlon and Jonas exited the
train to transfer to the Green Line and waited on the upper level
platform. While they were waiting, police testimony and reports
indicate that a group of five or six black youth surrounded, assaulted,
and robbed a twenty-two year old Hispanic man, Louis Fuentes, on the
lower platform. After the assault, the youth fled to the upper level
platform. Police arrived minutes later, interviewed witnesses who were
on the scene, and then searched for the group of five perpetrators on the
upper platform. The police found Marlon and Jonas waiting peacefully
for the next train and arrested them. Marlon tried to explain that he had
just come from work and even showed them his paycheck, but the
officers arrested these two black youth anyway. Subsequently, the police
led Marlon to the ambulance where Fuentes remembered Marlon’s
orange vest and identified him as one of his attackers.
Unfortunately, many state courts rarely exclude such identifications,
and Marlon’s judge chose not to exclude this one. Marlon’s case is still
pending, and he will likely be convicted of attempted robbery, among
other things, in large part because of the eyewitness identification.
Marlon’s conviction will ultimately be decided by a jury, but the
overwhelming evidence shows that jurors place substantial weight on
After
eyewitness testimony regardless of its lack of reliability.3
Because the case is still pending, “Marlon” is not the individual’s real name. It has
been changed for confidentiality reasons and because Marlon is a juvenile.
2
See infra notes 80–82 and accompanying text (explaining that a show-up identification
occurs when an officer apprehends a suspect, brings the suspect before the witness, and
subsequently asks the witness to make an identification).
3
See Elizabeth F. Loftus, Timothy P. O’Toole & Catharine F. Easterly, Juror
Understanding of Eyewitness Testimony: A Survey of 1000 Potential Jurors in the District of
1
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reviewing 250 DNA exonerations in the past thirty years, researchers
have found that eyewitness identification played a contributing role in
seventy-five percent of those convictions.4 Consequently, state courts

Columbia 1, 3 (2004) [hereinafter Survey], https://www.westshore.edu/personal/
jrpoindexter/sociology/PDS%20Poll%20-%20Juror%20Knowledge%20of%20Eyewitness%
20Factors%20-%20article%20by%20Dr.%20Elizabeth%20Loftus%20and%20Tim%20O'Toole.pdf (“[J]urors actually suffer from a basic misunderstanding of how memory
generally works, and similarly do not understand how particular factors, such as the effects
of stress or the use of a weapon, affect the accuracy of eyewitness testimony.”); see also
Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 352 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[T]here is almost
nothing more convincing than a live human being who takes the stand, points a finger at the
defendant, and says ‘That’s the one!’”). See generally BRIAN L. CUTLER & MARGARET BULL
KOVERA, EVALUATING EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION 3 (2010) (noting that an eyewitness
identification may be the only evidence connecting the suspect to the crime and suggesting
that eyewitnesses often have an extremely difficult task because they have little to gain and
may even feel that their individual safety may be threatened by the individual they are
accusing); Christian Sheehan, Note, Making the Jurors the “Experts”: The Case for Eyewitness
Identification Jury Instructions, 52 B.C. L. REV. 651, 674 (2011) (noting that jury instructions
are the best way to educate jurors about the dangers of eyewitness testimony because
expert testimony is often available only to wealthy defendants, creating a situation in
which indigent defendants receive little of its benefit).
4
See BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL
PROSECUTIONS GO WRONG 6–11, 48 (2011) (suggesting that after reviewing the cases of the
250 individuals who were exonerated he has identified patterns in how criminal
prosecutions typically go wrong, including: false confessions, unreliable eyewitness
identifications, flawed forensic evidence, dishonest informants, ineffective defense counsel,
inability to appeal, the extended period of time it takes to be exonerated, and the reluctance
of the criminal justice system as a whole to respond); see also Sheehan, supra note 3, at 653
(“Despite growing proof of the inaccuracy of traditional eyewitness identifications,
eyewitnesses remain powerful tools for law enforcement as nearly 80,000 suspects are
targeted each year based on eyewitness reports.”); Fact Sheet, INNOCENCE PROJECT,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/Content/Eyewitness_Identification_Reform.php (last
visited July, 28 2012) [hereinafter Fact Sheet] (explaining that eyewitness misidentifications
are the leading factor in wrongful convictions and suggesting reform in the following areas
by: (1) using a double blind procedure/blind administrator; (2) instructing the witness that
“the suspect may or may not be present in the lineup”; (3) composing the lineup in a
manner that does not bring unreasonable attention to the defendant; (4) taking a confidence
statement immediately following the identification; and (5) recording the entire lineup
procedure). See generally PETER NEUFELD & BARRY SCHECK, THE INNOCENTS (2003) (telling
the stories of fifty individuals who were wrongfully convicted and suggesting that there
are countless others who remain behind bars because of prosecutors who refuse to agree to
post-conviction DNA testing and Congress who has not passed legislation ensuring that
defendants have the right to DNA testing); Jessica A. Levitt, Note, Competing Rights Under
the Totality of the Circumstances Test: Expanding DNA Collection Statutes, 46 VAL. U. L. REV.
117 (suggesting that all fifty states adopt legislation allowing DNA samples to be collected
from arrestees); 250 Exonerated: Too Many Wrongly Convicted, INNOCENCE PROJECT 3 (2011)
[hereinafter 250 Exonerated], http://www.innocenceproject.org/docs/InnocenceProject
_250.pdf (finding that the 250 exonerated individuals spent an average of thirteen years in
prison individually before they were exonerated and collectively spent 3,160 years behind
bars).
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must consider whether there are adequate safeguards in place to prevent
the damaging effects of erroneous eyewitness testimony.5
New Jersey has taken the lead on this issue and recently established
new guidelines.6 First, this Note describes the variables that implicate
eyewitness accuracy and how jurors understand these variables.7 This
Note also examines how the Supreme Court has dealt with the
admissibility of eyewitness identifications and discusses the New Jersey
Supreme Court’s new approach.8 Second, this Note evaluates the
Supreme Court’s current approach in light of modern scientific data and
compares it to New Jersey’s approach.9 Last, this Note proposes that
each state adopt a modified version of New Jersey’s approach.10

5
See infra Part IV (suggesting that state courts adopt a modified version of New Jersey’s
approach); see also Sheehan, supra note 3, at 653–54 (acknowledging that the legal system
has attempted to address this issue through various procedural safeguards but recognizing
that these safeguards do not address the psychological factors affecting memory); Scott E.
Sundby, The Reasonable Doubt Rule and the Meaning of Innocence, 40 HASTINGS L.J. 457, 461
(1989) (“Whether treated as a moral, constitutional, or popular sentiment inquiry, the
greater injustice is almost universally seen in the conviction of the innocent.”) (footnotes
omitted).
6
See State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 878 (N.J. 2011) (departing from the Supreme
Court’s jurisprudence and announcing a more comprehensive framework, which
incorporates modern scientific data). See generally Adam Liptak, 34 Years Later, Supreme
Court
Will
Revisit
Eyewitness
IDs,
N.Y.
TIMES,
Aug.
22,
2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/23/us/23bar.html (pointing to the a report compiled
at the request of New Jersey’s Supreme Court as potential guidance for the Supreme Court
in the future); Troy Davis Execution Fuels Eyewitness ID Debate, USA TODAY, Sept. 27, 2011,
http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/2011-09-27/troy-davis-eyewitnesstestimony/50563754/1 [hereinafter Troy] (noting that the Supreme Court had not ruled on
the issue of eyewitness identification since 1977 and anticipating a change in its
jurisprudence); Benjamin Weiser, In New Jersey, Rules are Changed on Witness IDs, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 24, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/25/nyregion/in-new-jerseyrules-changed-on-witness-ids.html (estimating that New Jersey’s decision will have a
national impact because New Jersey is a leading authority in the area of criminal law);
Editorial, What Did They Really See? N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/
2011/08/27/opinion/what-did-eyewitnesses-really-see.html (urging the Supreme Court to
“pay close attention” to New Jersey’s recent decision). But see Perry v. New Hampshire,
132 S. Ct. 716, 730 (2012) (declining to substantially revise its eyewitness identification
jurisprudence).
7
See infra Part II.A (explaining how the infrastructure of the criminal justice system
along with psychological variables affect the reliability of an eyewitness identification).
8
See infra Part II.B (discussing the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence in the last thirty
years and explaining how New Jersey separated itself from the Supreme Court’s
approach).
9
See infra Part III (suggesting that the Supreme Court has failed to incorporate thirty
years of scientific data and examining the strengths and weaknesses of New Jersey’s
approach to eyewitness identification).
10
See infra Part IV (suggesting that New Jersey still needs to rid itself of some of the
vestiges of the traditional Supreme Court approach).
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II. BACKGROUND
An eyewitness’s memory is not infallible; rather, scientific research
suggests that memory is susceptible to distortion depending on the
presence of certain variables.11 But even if memory was always
dependable, the criminal justice system and its procedures are not.12
Part II.A examines the various factors affecting the reliability of an
eyewitness identification.13 Part II.B summarizes the Supreme Court’s
approach to eyewitness identification and also discusses New Jersey’s
manner of dealing with questionable eyewitness identifications.14
A. Eyewitness Accuracy: Variables and More Variables
Memory functions differently depending on a plethora of different
variables, all of which can affect the accuracy of eyewitness testimony.15
First, Part II.A.1 discusses the competing commitments to truth-seeking
in the criminal justice system.16 Next, Part II.A.2 analyzes memory and
the ways in which it may be affected depending on the particular
circumstances.17 Third, Part II.A.3 considers police procedure and how it

11
See infra Part II.A.2 (describing the variables that affect memory); see also Loftus et al.,
supra note 3, at 4–5 (“[H]uman memory is more selective than a video camera; the sensory
environment contains a vast amount of information but the memory process perceives and
accurately records only a very small percentage of that information. . . . [H]uman memory
can change in dramatic and unexpected ways.”); Calvin TerBeek, A Call for Precedential
Heads: Why the Supreme Court’s Eyewitness Identification Jurisprudence is Anachronistic and
Out-of-Step with the Empirical Reality, 31 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 21, 24–27 (2007) (providing a
thorough outline of the relevant factors that affect a witness’s memory).
12
See infra Part II.A.1, 3 (discussing the various professions and procedures that
contribute to the accuracy of an identification); see also Steven J. Joffee, Comment, Long
Overdue: Utah’s Incomplete Approach to Eyewitness Identification and Suggestions for Reform,
2010 UTAH L. REV. 443, 447–49 (2010) (providing an overview of the ways in which police
procedure may influence a witness’s identification); Katherine R. Kruse, Instituting
Innocence Reform: Wisconsin’s New Governance Experiment, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 645, 723–27
(2006) (discussing the competing goals and interests of law enforcement, defense lawyers,
and prosecutors and maintaining that these three groups are sometimes only partially
committed to truth seeking).
13
See infra Part II.A (analyzing the various factors that may affect how a witness
remembers a particular event and examining how jurors understand these variables).
14
See infra Part II.B (discussing the Supreme Court’s eyewitness identification
jurisprudence and New Jersey’s approach).
15
See Part II.A (discussing these variables).
16
See infra Part II.A.1 (providing a general overview of the moral professional
commitments of law enforcement, defense attorneys, and prosecutors).
17
See infra Part II.A.2 (explaining the three stages of memory and factors that affect each
stage).
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affects the reliability of an identification.18 Last, Part II.A.4 discusses
juror understanding of these variables.19
1.

Variables in the Commitment to Truth-Seeking

At least theoretically, the common goal of convicting the guilty and
freeing the innocent is what motivates law enforcement personnel,
defense attorneys, and prosecuting attorneys.20 However, in reality,
conflicting professional commitments may leave these groups only
partially committed to seeking the truth in each and every case.21 Thus,
the admissibility of an eyewitness identification may depend, at least
partly, on the moral imperative of the three groups involved.22 Police
officers, in particular, face unique challenges while pursuing truth in this
country’s criminal justice system.23

See infra Part II.A.3 (describing the effect of commonly used police procedures).
See infra Part II.A.4 (discussing the average juror’s knowledge of how memory works
in relation to an identification).
20
Kruse, supra note 12, at 723 (“DNA exonerations have served as a rallying point for
problem-solving approaches to criminal justice reform because they remind diverse
stakeholders, whose interests and viewpoints are most often at odds in the highly
adversarial context of the criminal justice system, of their common interest in ensuring
accurate convictions.”); see also In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (Harlan, J., concurring) (“[I]t
is far worse to convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free.”). See generally
GARRETT, supra note 4, at 182 (“Errors are the insects in the world of law, traveling through
it in swarms, often unnoticed in their endless procession. Many are plainly harmless; some
appear ominously harmful.”); Peter Arenella, Rethinking the Functions of Criminal Procedure:
The Warren and Burger Courts’ Competing Ideologies, 72 GEO. L.J. 185, 198 (1983) (“At least in
theory, our system prefers erroneous acquittals over erroneous convictions.”); Mirjan
Damaška, Evidentiary Barriers to Conviction and Two Models of Criminal Procedure: A
Comparative Study, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 506, 576 (1973) (“Unfortunately, there is a conflict
between these two desires: the more we want to prevent errors in the direction of
convicting the innocent, the more we run the risk of acquitting the guilty.”); Alexander
Volokh, n Guilty Men, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 173, 198 (1997) (discussing the history of the
constitutional value scheme, which embraces a presumption of innocence).
21
See infra Part II.A (outlining the professional commitments of law enforcement,
defense attorneys, and prosecutors).
22
See generally MODEL RULES of PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.8 (2004) (outlining the duties and
responsibilities of prosecutors and holding them to a higher standard because of the
considerable discretion inherent in their position); Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Beyond
Justifications: Seeking Motivations to Sustain Public Defenders, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1239, 1258
(1993) (explaining that most public defenders are motivated by a deep sense of
discontentment with the current justice system, which compels them to vigorously defend
both the guilty and innocent in the system); Robert K. Olson, Miscarriage of Justice: A Cop’s
View, 86 JUDICATURE, Sept.–Oct. 2002, at 74, 74 (illustrating the complexities and conflicts of
interest involved in the life of a police officer).
23
See infra note 24 and accompanying text (discussing some of the challenges facing
police officers).
18
19
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Law enforcement personnel are committed to preserving the safety
of the general public who abide by the law and apprehending those who
jeopardize the safety of the public by breaking the law.24 Consequently,
the motivating moral imperative is to punish lawbreakers who threaten
the safety of others.25 The values of public safety and truth-telling may
compete for the commitment of law enforcement in certain instances,
especially when defense attorneys are waiting to exploit each and every
procedural shortcoming.26
Criminal defense lawyers are committed to preserving the rights of
the accused individual, regardless of innocence or guilt.27 The defense
24
Kruse, supra note 12, at 723–24 (“Law enforcement’s primary professional
commitment is to public safety, which may lead to the desire to get dangerous criminals off
the street by any means possible.”). See generally GARRETT, supra note 4, at 49–50 (providing
that in cases where individuals were wrongly convicted, police may have genuinely
believed they had the guilty party, but may have unintentionally utilized an unreliable
procedure because of inadequate training, loose standards, and little accountability from
judges); Olson, supra note 22, at 74–75 (2002) (explaining that there are several factors that
may prevent law enforcement from apprehending the perpetrator including: a strenuous
workload, a skewed concept of innocence, pressure to solve cases, and poorly trained
personnel).
25
Olson, supra note 22, at 74. Olson has served as the Chief of Police in Minneapolis
since 1995 and describes the general mindset of his colleagues as follows: “[G]uilt is guilt”
and the offender either “did it” or “did not.” Id. Police officers do not see guilt and
innocence as a matter of degree. Id. “The detective wants to know whether the suspect
committed a criminal act or not.” Id.
26
See Kruse, supra note 12, at 723–24 (explaining that excluding an eyewitness
identification may seem like a “loophole” in the system, which may force law enforcement
officers to make a choice between excluding evidence relevant to the proceeding and
admitting evidence that is not entirely reliable). See generally Richard J. Ofshe & Richard A.
Leo, The Decision to Confess Falsely: Rational Choice and Irrational Action, 74 DENV. U. L. REV.
979, 985–86 (1997) (providing that during an interrogation police may employ ethically
questionable tactics in an effort to gain a confession at the expense of observing lawful
procedures).
27
See Ogletree, supra note 22, at 1246 (explaining that the Sixth Amendment guarantees
criminal defendants the right to counsel; thus, defense attorneys need not worry about
guilt or innocence). See generally Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689, 694 (1988)
(holding that the Constitution requires that indigent defendants receive minimally effective
counsel, but it need only fall “within [a] wide range of reasonable professional assistance”
and that in order to have a guilty verdict overturned for reason of ineffective assistance of
counsel, a defendant must show that “there is a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different”);
GARRETT, supra note 4, at 205 (“Ineffective assistance of counsel is one of the most
frequently raised claims during postconviction proceedings, and 32% of these DNA
exonerees (52 of 165 cases) asserted that their trial was unfair because their defense lawyer
was inadequate.”); Darryl K. Brown, The Decline of Defense Counsel and the Rise of Accuracy in
Criminal Adjudication, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 1585, 1645 (2005) (“[T]he strategy of pursuing
accuracy through adversarial processes--through well-equipped defense counsel in
particular--has reached a political limit. Broadly speaking, legislatures are interested in
accurate criminal adjudication, but they do not view zealous defense attorneys as the best
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lawyer tends to see criminal defendants in the context of “societal ills,
understandable human weakness, and tragic cycles of harm,” which
causes him to believe that justice does not always demand punishment
for the law-breaker.28 Thus, preventing the conviction of the innocent
and helping the guilty avoid punishment are equally noble moral
imperatives.29 This worldview motivates the defense attorney to search
tirelessly for any error on the part of law enforcement or the prosecutor
in order to obtain a dismissal or acquittal for the client.30 Prosecutors,
however, generally see the criminal justice system from a much different
perspective.31
Prosecutors are committed to observing procedural rules and
exercising prosecutorial discretion in an effort to advance substantive
justice.32 The prosecutor’s commitment to procedural compliance may
way to achieve that goal.”); Abbe Smith & William Montross, The Calling of Criminal
Defense, 50 MERCER L. REV. 443, 458–82 (1999) (arguing that criminal defense work has its
roots in Jewish and Christian teaching); Holly R. Stevens, Colleen E. Sheppard, Robert
Spangenbeg, Aimee Wickman & Jon B. Gould., State, County and Local Expenditures for
Indigent Defense Services Fiscal Year 2008, CENTER FOR JUST., LAW & SOC’Y at GEO. MASON U.
1, 6–7 (2010), http://www.thecrimereport.org/system/storage/2/5c/a/1071/abareport_
indigentdefense.pdf (examining the inadequate amount of money that states and localities
spend to provide defense counsel to indigent defendants, which inevitably results in
ineffective defense counsel at trial).
28
Kruse, supra note 12, at 724; see also Barbara Allen Babcock, The Duty to Defend, 114
YALE L.J. 1489, 1517 (2005) (“[P]ublic defending [is] a sacred duty that requires a certain
soul-set and selflessness that only a special class of people is capable of achieving: a
mindset that values freedom over justice any day.”); Keith A. Findley, Innocents at Risk:
Adversary Imbalance, Forensic Science, and the Search for Truth, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 893,
895–96 (2008) (arguing that while the legal system claims to put the risk of error on the
government, practically speaking the legal system puts the burden on the accused;
moreover, this practice is inconsistent with the constitutional doctrine that innocenceprotection is of the utmost importance).
29
See Ogletree, supra note 22, at 1246–50 (exploring the various justifications and
motivations that motivate defense attorneys).
30
See id. (discussing the tensions that criminal defense attorneys must struggle with as
they pursue their client’s best interest). See generally Brown, supra note 27, at 1601 (arguing
that defense attorneys must represent criminal defendants with “fewer legal tools” than
prosecutors).
31
See infra notes 32–35 and accompanying text (examining the role and influence of the
prosecutor in today’s adversarial system).
32
See GARRETT, supra note 4, at 208 (asserting that the prosecutor plays an imperative
role in cases involving eyewitness identifications because prosecutors present most of the
evidence, call most of the witnesses, communicate with police, and have access to all of the
evidence that is in police custody); see also Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935)
(explaining that a prosecutor’s role is to ensure that “justice shall be done,” and not simply
to increase his own reputation by securing convictions). See generally Darden v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 181 (1986) (holding that judges may order a new trial for
prosecutorial misconduct only in the most extreme cases in which the conduct, “so infected
the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a denial of due process”);
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conflict with law enforcement’s interest in punishing law-breakers,
because the prosecutor may choose to reduce or drop charges on the
basis of the strength and admissibility of the evidence.33 A prosecutor
has a higher duty to carefully exercise discretion because a defense
attorney may figuratively fight to the death for the rights of his client
regardless of guilt or innocence while the prosecutor should not move
forward unless convinced the defendant is truly guilty.34 But, in
practice, while defense attorneys attempt to exploit every procedural
shortcoming of law enforcement and prosecutors, prosecutors are also
Kathleen A. Ridolfi & Maurice Possley, Preventable Error: A Report on Prosecutorial
Misconduct in California, 1997–2009, VERITAS INITIATIVE (2010), http://law.scu.edu/ncip/
file/ProsecutorialMisconduct_BookEntire_online%20version.pdf (pointing out that
prosecutors in California are rarely sanctioned or disciplined for misconduct, which does
little to deter prosecutorial misconduct); Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of
Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors Do Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REV. 45, 91 (1991)
(explaining that in closing statements prosecutors may nearly misrepresent facts to the jury
because the procedural guidelines for prosecutors allow for them to make arguments about
inferences to be drawn from the facts); Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, Trial & Error
Part
1:
The
Verdict:
Dishonor,
CHI.
TRIB.,
January
11,
1999,
http://www.chicagotribune.com/news/watchdog/chi-020103trial1,0,479347.story (“The
failure of prosecutors to obey the demands of justice--and the legal system’s failure to hold
them accountable for it--leads to wrongful convictions. . . . It also fosters a corrosive
distrust in a branch of government that America holds up as a standard to the world.”).
33
See Robert L. Misner, Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY
717, 736–38 (1996) (arguing that prosecutors and law enforcement have a tremendous
amount of discretion at their disposal). See generally STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 33.9(a) (2008) (“A prosecutor should not institute, cause to be instituted, or permit the
continued pendency of criminal charges in the absence of sufficient admissible evidence to
support a conviction.”); Zacharias, supra note 32, at 59 (noting that prosecutors have at their
disposal the state’s resources, as well as close relationships with the police and grand jury).
34
See Zacharias, supra note 32, at 64 (explaining that, because of her power and prestige,
a prosecutor must commit herself to the fairness of the adversarial system by not taking
advantage of its shortcomings); see also Berger, 295 U.S. at 88 (stating that while a prosecutor
“may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones” or use “improper methods
calculated to produce a wrongful conviction”); Kenneth J. Melilli, Prosecutorial Discretion in
an Adversary System, 1992 BYU. L. REV. 669, 680–81 (1992) (arguing that the “probable
cause” standard is in reality a “heightened suspicion” standard, which does little protect
those who are not guilty); Abbe Smith, Defending the Innocent, 32 CONN. L. REV. 485, 509–12
(2000) (illustrating the lengths that a criminal defense attorney will go to protect her client).
The author concludes by saying:
The best criminal defense lawyers have some sense of what the truth
is, but are not hamstrung by it. Good criminal trial lawyers know how
to use various aspects of the truth in order to construct a compelling
narrative—one that jurors will accept, or one that will at least raise
reasonable doubt. But, generally, criminal defense lawyers cannot and
must not spend much time or energy worrying about the truth. After
all, most criminal defendants are not innocent, and the truth is usually
not helpful to the defense.
Id. at 511.
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tempted to secure a conviction utilizing whatever means possible
regardless of guilt or innocence.35 An identification’s admissibility may
be influenced by the various parties involved, but its reliability may be
affected by the three stages of memory.36
2.

Variables in the Three Stages of Memory

As counterintuitive as it may seem, memory is not an infallible
recording device.37 On the contrary, scientific studies from the past
thirty-four years show that multiple factors affect a person’s ability to
reconstruct and recall a past event.38 Researchers divide the memory
process into three distinct stages: (1) the process of perceiving, (2)
retaining, and (3) retrieving a particular event.39 As the event is taking
place, a witness is in the process of consciously or subconsciously
collecting information, which is known as the perception stage.40 During
the retention stage, the witness will file away or store this initial
perception until he or she attempts to recall the information.41 This

35
See Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 393, 395–401 (1992)
(explaining that prosecutors have an expanding role in today’s criminal system, which
allows a prosecutor to employ intrusive undercover tactics, aggressive grand jury
interaction, and an increased power to bring charges); see also GARRETT, supra note 4, at 209
(arguing that prosecutorial misconduct is extremely difficult to prove because courts rarely
recommend sanctions and are reluctant to “call out prosecutors on misconduct or ethical
lapses”); Melilli, supra note 34, at 682–83 (noting that disciplinary rules do little to deter
misconduct because the judiciary rarely disciplines prosecutors for violating them).
36
See infra notes 39–43 and accompanying text (describing the three stages of memory).
37
ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL, § 2-2, 12 (4th ed.
2007) (“[W]e do not simply record [events] in our memory as a videotape recorder would.
The situation is much more complex.”); see also Loftus et al., supra note 3, at 4–5 (discussing
the various factors that influence a witness’s memory of a particular event).
38
See Loftus, supra note 37, at § 2-5, 19–20 (citing a study in which the participants were
shown a thirty second simulated bank robbery and then asked to estimate how long it
lasted and only a very small percentage of the participants guessed the amount of time
correctly).
39
See Derek Simmonsen, Teach Your Jurors Well: Using Jury Instructions to Educate Jurors
About Factors Affecting the Accuracy of Eyewitness Testimony, 70 MD. L. REV. 1044, 1049 (2011)
(suggesting that the average person does not understand the fundamentals of how memory
works); Loftus, supra note 37, at § 2-2, 12–13 (showing how each of these three stages of
memory may be affected by different variables).
40
See Simmonsen, supra note 39, at 1049 (explaining that at this stage the eyewitness
may be affected by variables that are part of the event itself and variables that exist
subconsciously in the eyewitness); see also Loftus, supra note 37, at § 2-2, 12–15 (labeling this
the “acquisition” stage).
41
See Loftus, supra note 37, at § 2-2, 13 & § 3-2(a), 53–54 (noting that how an eyewitness
remembers an event is affected by the normal process of forgetting and by subsequent
interactions with third parties); Simmonsen, supra note 39, at 1051 (“Receiving new
information after an event can change how a person later remembers that event.”).
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remembering is known as the retrieval stage.42 Various dangers
accompany each stage, threatening to pollute the elusive “perfect”
memory.43
The facts surrounding the event (“event factors”) affect the witness’s
perception of the event.44 The physical proximity of the witness to the
event, the lighting conditions, and the duration of the event are relevant
factors in an identification analysis.45 The degree of stress and the level
of violence also affect the ability of a witness to make a reliable
identification.46 Closely connected to stress and violence is the presence
of a weapon, which can muddle the perception of an eyewitness.47 In
addition to the event factors, every individual has intrinsic traits, which
may also affect his or her perception.48
Certain characteristics inherent in the witness or the suspect tend to
make identifications more or less reliable (“witness factors”).49 Perhaps
42
See Scott Woller, Note, Rethinking the Role of Expert Testimony Regarding the Reliability of
Eyewitness Identifications in New York, 48 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 323, 341–45 (2004) (providing
an outline of factors that may influence a memory during the retrieval stage).
43
See id. (discussing the dangers that accompany a memory during each stage); see also
Simmonsen, supra note 39, at 1051 (“[T]he concept of memory involves multiple stages and
a myriad of factors that can influence how a person perceives and remembers events.”).
44
See Sheehan, supra note 3, at 656 (exploring how the various event factors affect the
eyewitness’s perception of events); Woller, supra note 42, at 341 (“Event factors are factors
inherent in an event itself.”).
45
See Sheehan, supra note 3, at 656 (explaining that identification becomes increasingly
difficult with greater distance and poor lighting). See generally Suzannah B. Gambell,
Comment, The Need to Revisit the Neil v. Biggers Factors: Suppressing Unreliable Eyewitness
Identifications, 6 WYO. L. REV. 189, 197 (2006) (arguing that the accuracy of an eyewitness
identification increases in proportion to the amount of time the witness had to view the
event).
46
See Gambell, supra note 45, at 198–99 (explaining that violence and high levels of stress
narrow a witness’s attention and trigger defense mechanisms, which allows an individual
to confront the threatening situation; however, this reaction can impair a witness’s ability
to accurately identify the perpetrator and hinder the witness from recalling relevant details
about the crime); see also Roger B. Handberg, Expert Testimony on Eyewitness Identification: A
New Pair of Glasses for the Jury, 32 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1013, 1023 (1995) (indicating that the
common perception of stress among lay people is that it enhances an impression left upon
an eyewitness; however, a witness in an extremely stressful situation is more likely to
misidentify a suspect).
47
See Gambell, supra note 45, at 198–99 (explaining the phenomenon known as “weapon
focus,” in which a weapon draws a witness’s attention away from the face of the
perpetrator and toward the weapon itself, making it more difficult for a witness to make a
positive identification or describe the perpetrator at a later date).
48
See infra notes 49–56 and accompanying text (discussing the probable effect of the
various witness factors on an eyewitness identification).
49
Sheehan, supra note 3, at 656–57 (providing a thorough list of witness factors that
affect perception, paying particularly close attention to the effect of violence on the
eyewitness); see also Woller, supra note 42, at 342 (“Witness factors, on the other hand, are
factors that are inherent in the witness herself.”).
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the most obvious witness factors involve visual defects pertaining to the
witness’s eyesight, including age, darkness adaptation, depth perception,
and color blindness.50 Also, a witness is more likely to accurately
identify a suspect whose face contains some distinguishing feature.51
Furthermore, the elderly and very young produce mistaken
identifications at a much higher rate than other adults.52 However, an
eyewitness’s perception or acquisition may also be influenced by cultural
and personal features.53
Various cultural and personal characteristics influence how a
witness perceives sensory data in the perception phase of memory.54 The
cliché, “they all look alike,” is at least partially true when it comes to
cross racial identifications.55 Scientific studies have shown that an
eyewitness is more likely to accurately identify someone of the same race
than someone of another race.56 Additionally, juries tend to believe the
See LAWRENCE TAYLOR, EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION, §§ 1, 2-1 (1982) (pointing out the
obvious problems these disabilities create); see also Gambell, supra note 45, at 198 (“The
witness’s line of sight and the amount of lighting should also be considered.”). See generally
Henry F. Fradella, Why Judges Should Admit Expert Testimony on the Unreliability of
Eyewitness Testimony, 2 FED. CTS. L. REV. 1, 9 (2007) (mentioning alcohol and drug
intoxication as other factors that affect an eyewitness’s memory).
51
See TerBeek, supra note 11, at 24 (explaining that unusual faces make an accurate
identification much more likely).
52
Id. at 24. See generally State v. Michaels, 642 A.2d 1372, 1379 (N.J. 1994) (“[T]he use of
coercive or highly suggestive interrogation techniques can create a significant risk that the
interrogation itself will distort the child’s recollection of events, thereby undermining the
reliability of the statements and subsequent testimony concerning such events.”); Stephen J.
Ceci & Richard D. Friedman, The Suggestibility of Children: Scientific Research and Legal
Implications, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 33, 34 (2000) (suggesting that children should still be
permitted to testify and recommends that in some circumstances judges allow experts to
speak on the suggestibility of children); Michael R. Keenan, Child Witnesses: Implications of
Contemporary Suggestibility Research in a Changing Landscape, 26 DEV. MENTAL HEALTH L.
100, 101 (2007) (explaining that children are much more susceptible to leading questions
than adults although they are reliable witnesses when answering open-ended questions).
53
See infra notes 54–56 and accompanying text (discussing the various dangers involved
when an eyewitness identifies a person of another race).
54
See Sheehan, supra note 3, at 657 (explaining how cultural bias, personal prejudice, and
prior experiences influence an individual’s perception).
55
See TerBeek, supra note 11, at 26–27 (suggesting this “other-race effect” has been
proved with such certainty that it should be considered a fact); Bethany Shelton, Comment,
Turning a Blind Eye to Justice: Kansas Courts Must Integrate Scientific Research Regarding
Eyewitness Testimony into the Courtroom, 56 KAN. L. REV. 949, 951–52 (2008) (showing that
identifying someone of another race is more difficult than identifying someone of your
own race).
56
See GARRETT, supra note 4, at 73 (articulating the racial disparity among exoneree
cases). Of those who were exonerated by DNA evidence, Garrett found that white women
misidentified black men in 71 out of 93 cases involving a cross-racial identification. Id. In
addition, race may be a factor in a criminal case because prosecutors tend to increase the
charges leveled against a black defendant when the victim is white because evidence
50
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testimony of a confident eyewitness even though studies show that
confidence has little correlation with accuracy.57 Prosecutors and
defense attorneys alike know that there is no more powerful piece of
evidence than a witness who stands before the jury and points a finger at
who he or she believes is the perpetrator.58 An eyewitness’s confidence
may be inflated or deflated depending on his or her exposure to outside
influences and post identification feedback.59 Even if a memory is not
distorted by event and witness factors in the perception phase, it remains
susceptible to distortion in the retention stage.60
suggests that white jurors may be harsher on black defendants when the victim is white.
Id. Gary L. Wells & Elizabeth A. Olson, The Other-Race Effect in Eyewitness Identification:
What Do We Do About It?, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 230, 232–38 (2001) (offering studies to
show that the risk of misidentification is higher when trying to identify someone of a
different race). See generally Lawrence A. Greenfeld, Sex Offenses and Offenders, U.S. DEP’T
OF JUST. 1, 11 (1997), http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/SOO.PDF (showing that
the victim and attacker are of the same race in 88% of rape cases and determining that rape
victims are almost evenly divided among blacks and whites); MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE
NEW JIM CROW 4, 8–9 (2010). The author argues that incarceration of people of color in
America operates in much the same way as Jim Crow laws during the Civil Rights
Movement. Id. at 4. Two million people are held in prisons and jails in America today and
“[o]ne in three young African American men is currently under the control of the criminal
justice system—in prison, in jail, on probation, or on parole.” Id. at 8–9. The author notes
that, once released, incarcerated individuals are “confined to the margins of mainstream
society and denied access to the mainstream economy. They are legally denied the ability
to obtain employment, housing, and public benefits—much as African Americans were
once forced into a segregated second-class citizenship in the Jim Crow era.” Id. at 4. See
generally Estella Baker, From“Making Bad People Worse” to “Prison Works”: Sentencing Policy
In England And Wales in the 1990s, 7 CRIM. L.F. 639 (1996) (illustrating that incarceration
creates additional problems in our society).
57
See Gambell, supra note 45, at 202 (describing various influences that affect a witness’s
confidence); see also GARRETT, supra note 4, at 49 (suggesting that eyewitness confidence is
often created by events that occurred prior to trial). In 92 out of 161 trial transcripts
obtained from the trials of exonerated individuals the eyewitnesses admitted that they
were not absolutely certain they had the right man when they made the initial
identification. Id. at 49.
58
Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 352 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting); see Gambell,
supra note 45, at 202 (suggesting that prosecutors and defense attorneys may also be misled
by a confident eyewitness).
59
See Sheehan, supra note 3, at 658–59 (explaining how post-event information from the
police, media, or other witnesses may have an extremely influential effect on witnesses
during the retention phase); Peter J. Cohen, How Shall They Be Known? Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals and Eyewitness Identification, 16 PACE L. REV. 237, 246 (1996) (“Postevent exposure to newly released information can dramatically affect the memory of the
original event. . . . When witnesses later learn new information which conflicts with the
original input, many will compromise between what they saw and what they were told
later on.”); Fradella, supra note 50, at 10 (asserting that discussions with third parties are
more likely to negatively influence a memory than the mere passage of time).
60
See infra notes 61–63 and accompanying text (describing the retention stage and the
factors that may affect a memory during this stage).
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After the initial perception and acquisition of the information, the
witness will then commit the information to memory, which is known as
the retention stage.61 During this stage, the amount of information the
witness processed and the retention interval are two factors that may
lead to an inaccurate identification.62 Thus, a witness who retrieves a
large amount of data after an extended period of time will probably be
less reliable than a witness who recalls a small amount of information
after a brief period of time.63 Although a memory may be unscathed
through the first two phases, it must then pass through the retrieval
phase before an eyewitness may testify accurately.64
In addition to the dangers inherent in the perception and retention
phases, a phenomenon known as “unconscious transference” may
threaten the accuracy of an identification during the retrieval phase.65
This occurs when a witness mistakenly combines or confuses two similar
memories and mistakenly identifies a person from an unrelated memory
as the person at the scene of the crime, resulting in a misidentification.66
Event and witness factors may influence a witness’s memory, but
interactions with third parties, including law enforcement, may also
affect identifications.67

Sheehan, supra note 3, at 657–58 (“The accuracy of an identification can also be
negatively impacted during the retention and retrieval phases of memory.”). See generally
Fradella, supra note 50, at 7–8 (discussing the effect of the passage of time, amount of data
to be retained, and post-event information on this stage of memory).
62
Fradella, supra note 50, at 7–8; see also Cohen, supra note 59, at 246 (explaining that the
amount of time between acquisition and retrieval is a significant factor in the quality of a
memory).
63
See Sheehan, supra note 3, at 657–58.
64
See infra notes 65–67 and accompanying text (discussing unconscious transference and
its effects on a subsequent identification).
65
See Francis A. Gilligan, Edward J. Imwinkelried & Elizabeth F. Loftus, The Theory of
“Unconscious Transference”: The Latest Threat to the Shield Laws Protecting the Privacy of
Victims of Sex Offenses, 38 B.C. L. REV. 107, 111–14 (1996) (providing a detailed description
of the various factors that contribute to the occurrence of unconscious transference); see also
Sean S. Hunt, The Admissibility of Eyewitness-Identification Expert Testimony in Oklahoma, 63
OKLA. L. REV. 511, 520 (2011) (“The witness’s brain unconsciously superimposes memories
on top of each other, usually at the expense of memorial accuracy.”).
66
See Hunt, supra note 65, at 520 (stating that even confident eyewitnesses may confuse
memories because of unconscious transference).
67
See infra notes 68–85 and accompanying text (outlining commonly used police
procedures and their effect on an identification).
61
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Variables in the System & Police Procedure

Police officers have the challenging task of balancing administrative
efficiency and procedural fairness in a society rampant with crime.68
Police procedure in line-ups may intentionally or unintentionally affect
the reliability of an identification.69 Although different jurisdictions have
taken precautionary steps to ensure more reliable line-up procedures,
three types of bias remain prevalent within the system: (1) foil bias,
(2) instruction bias, and (3) presentation bias.70
Foil bias may arise when a line-up is organized so that the suspect
physically stands out from the other “fillers” in some way.71
68
See ALEXANDER, supra note 56, at 8–9 (stating that our nation’s jails and prisons held
less than 350,000 people in 1972 compared to over two million today).
69
Melissa B. Russano, Jason J. Dickinson, Sarah M. Greathouse & Margaret Bull Kovera.,
“Why Don’t You Take Another Look at Number Three?”: Investigator Knowledge and Its Effects
on Eyewitness Confidence and Identification Decisions, 4 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J.
355, 358–59; see Jennifer L. Devenport, Steven D. Penrod & Brian L. Cutler, Eyewitness
Identification Evidence: Evaluating Commonsense Evaluations, 3 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 338,
344 (1997) (arguing that even judges and attorneys are not fully aware of the effect of
certain factors on memory); see also Amy Bradfield Douglass, Caroline Smith & Rebecca
Fraser-Thill, A Problem with Double-Blind Photospread Procedures: Photospread Administrators
Use One Eyewitness’s Confidence to Influence the Identification of Another Witness, 29 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 543, 543–62 (2005) (showing that one witness’s memory may be influenced
when exposed to the identification of another witness).
70
Sheehan, supra note 3, at 659. See generally Amy L. Bradfield, Gary L. Wells &
Elizabeth A. Olson, The Damaging Effect of Confirming Feedback on the Relation Between
Eyewitness Certainty and Identification Accuracy, 87 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 112, 117 (2002); Ryan
M. Haw & Ronald P. Fisher, Effects on Administrator-Witness Contact on Eyewitness
Identification Accuracy, 89 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 1106, 1106–07 (2004); R.C.L. Lindsay, Joanna
D. Pozzulo, Wendy Craig, Kang Lee & Samantha Corber, Simultaneous Lineups, Sequential
Lineups, and Showups: Eyewitness Identification Decisions of Adults and Children, 21 LAW &
HUM. BEHAV. 391, 402 (1997); Mark R. Phillips, Bradley D. McAuliff, Margaret Bull Kovera
& Brian L. Cutler, Double-Blind Photoarray Administration as a Safeguard Against Investigator
Bias, 84 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 940, 941 (1999); Carolyn Semmler, Neil Brewer & Gary L.
Wells, Effects of Postidentification Feedback on Eyewitness Identification and Nonidentification
Confidence, 89 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 334, 342–43 (2004); Siegfried Ludwig Sporer et al.,
Choosing, Confidence, and Accuracy: A Meta-Analysis of the Confidence-Accuracy Relation in
Eyewitness Identification Studies, 118 PSYCHOL. BULL. 315, 324 (1995); Gary L. Wells & Amy L.
Bradfield, “Good, You Identified the Suspect”: Feedback to Eyewitnesses Distorts Their Reports of
the Witnessing Experience, 83 J. APPLIED SCI. 360, 360 (1998).
71
See Donald P. Judges, Two Cheers for the Department of Justice’s Eyewitness Evidence: A
Guide for Law Enforcement, 53 ARK. L. REV. 231, 258–59 (2000) (explaining that eyewitnesses
sometimes choose the person in the lineup that most resembles the perpetrator even when
the suspect is not in the line-up); Gary L. Wells & Eric P. Seelau, Eyewitness Identification:
Psychological Research and Legal Policy on Lineups, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 765, 771 (1995)
(discussing how an innocent suspect is much more likely to be chosen in a line-up if the
individual matches the eyewitness’s description, but the other fillers do not); Loftus, supra
note 37, at § 4–9 (explaining that a filler is an individual in the line-up who is known to be
innocent and that the most reliable identifications occur when the suspect does not stand
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Conspicuous characteristics include: age, race, clothing, height and
weight, hair style, facial hair, tattoos, and any other distinguishing
features.72 If the witness correctly identifies the suspect in a line-up of
physically similar individuals, then the risk of misidentification is
lessened.73 But even if the line-up is organized properly, an officer may
skew the results by offering feedback to the witness during the
procedure.74
Instruction bias occurs when the administering officer intentionally
or unintentionally offers feedback to the witness.75 The risk of bias is
reduced substantially when the officer, before the witness views the lineup, informs the witness that the suspect may or may not be present in
the line-up.76 The officer should be very conscious of his or her body
language to avoid sending any confirmatory signals and behave as
objectively as possible even if the witness makes a positive
identification.77 A practice known as “blind administration” practically
out from the other fillers because this type of procedure is the best test of the eyewitness’s
memory).
72
Gambell, supra note 45, at 196.
73
See id. at 193, 195–96 (citing unreliable police procedures as one of the reasons for
misidentifications); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15A-284.52(5) (2008) (requiring that the
suspect shall “not unduly stand out from the fillers” and that the fillers “shall resemble, as
much as practicable, the eyewitness’s description of the perpetrator in significant features,
including any unique or unusual features”).
74
See infra notes 75–79 and accompanying text (discussing the ways in which an officer
may influence an eyewitness).
75
See Michael R. Leippe, The Case for Expert Testimony About Eyewitness Memory, 1
PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 909, 916 (1995) (suggesting that instruction bias also occurs if the
administering officer fails to tell the eyewitness that the perpetrator may or may not be
present in the line-up); Wells & Seelau, supra note 71, at 769 (explaining that some
eyewitnesses approach a line-up assuming that the perpetrator is definitely among those
individuals in the line-up and asserting that it is the administrator’s duty to inform the
eyewitness that the perpetrator may or may not be present); see also § 15A-284.52(3)
(requiring law enforcement to instruct eyewitnesses, “[t]he perpetrator might or might not
be presented in the lineup,” and that “[i]t is as important to exclude innocent persons as it
is to identify the perpetrator”); Lisa K. Rozzano, The Use of Hypnosis in Criminal Trials: The
Black Letter of the Black Art, 21 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 635, 645 (1987) (explaining that some
jurisdictions admit identifications that occurred after the police hypnotized the witness
even though hypnotism has not been linked with an increase in accuracy and may even
cause the witness to be more susceptible to suggestion).
76
See Sheehan, supra note 3, at 660 (explaining that knowledge that the suspect may not
be present helps ensure that the witness accurately identifies the perpetrator instead of
choosing the individual who most closely resembles the suspect relative to the others in the
lineup); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EYEWITNESS EVIDENCE: A TRAINER’S MANUAL FOR LAW
ENFORCEMENT 32 (2003) [hereinafter MANUAL] (“Fair composition of a lineup enables the
witness to provide a more accurate identification or nonidentification. . . . The investigator
should compose the lineup in such a manner that the suspect does not unduly stand out.”).
77
See MANUAL, supra note 76, at 42–43 (“The identification procedure should be
conducted in a manner that promotes the reliability, fairness, and objectivity of the
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eliminates the risk of instruction bias because the administering officer is
not informed which individual is the suspect.78 However, the most
damning form of bias occurs in a show-up identification.79
Law enforcement may present the suspect to the witness in an
inherently suggestive manner giving rise to presentation bias.80 Perhaps
the most controversial method is referred to as a show-up
identification.81 In a show-up, the police bring the suspected perpetrator
before the witness and ask the witness to make an identification.82

witness’s identification.”). See generally Deah S. Quinlivan, Jeffery S. Neuschatz, Angelina
Jimenez, Andrew D. Cling, Amy Bradfield Douglass & Charles A. Goodsell, Do
Prophylactics Prevent Inflation? Post-Identification Feedback and the Effectiveness of Procedures to
Protect Against Confidence-Inflation in Earwitnesses, 33 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 111, 112 (2009)
(indicating that more research needs to be done in order to determine whether suggestive
procedures affect voice lineups in the same manner as eyewitness lineups).
78
See Fradella, supra note 50, at 17 (referring to this as a “double-blind” procedure);
Steven Penrod, Eyewitness Identification Evidence: How Well are Witnesses and Police
Performing?, 18 CRIM. JUST., Spring 2003, at 45 (explaining that blind administration reduces
the risk of error when an eyewitness has a poor memory of the perpetrator); Wells &
Seelau, supra note 71, at 775–76 (suggesting that agents and officers who are closely
involved in a case should not administer line-ups); Fact Sheet, supra note 4 (listing
jurisdictions who have adopted sequential double blind procedures: New Jersey; North
Carolina; Boston, Mass.; Northamptom, Mass.; Madison, Wisc.; Winston-Salem, N.C.;
Hennepin, Minn.; Ramsey-County, Minn.; Santa Clara County, Calif.; and Virginia Beach,
Virginia); see also § 15A-284.52(b)(1) (requiring that an “[i]ndependent administrator”
oversee the line-up); Amy Klobuchar, Nancy K. Mehrkens Steblay & Hilary Lindell
Caligiuri, Improving Eyewitness Identifications: Hennepin County’s Blind Sequential Lineup
Pilot Project, 4 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 381, 405–10 (2006) (offering suggestions
for law enforcement when implementing blind administration).
79
See infra notes 81–82 and accompanying text (describing the process law enforcement
follows when administering a show-up identification).
80
Sheehan, supra note 3, at 661; see also Ryann M. Haw, Jason J. Dickinson & Christian A.
Meissner, The Phenomenology of Carryover Effects Between Show-up and Line-up Identification,
15 MEMORY 117, 118 (2007) (stating that when a witness participates in multiple lineup
procedures, such as a photo array and subsequent live line up, the eyewitness is more
likely to make an erroneous identification).
81
See Gambell, supra note 45, at 193–94 (identifying the rare circumstances when a showup may be necessary but explaining that most courts view show-ups as presumptively
suggestive); see also Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 133–34 (1977) (holding that show-up
identifications “give no assurance that the witness can identify the criminal from among a
number of persons of similar appearance [which is] surely the strongest evidence that there
was no misidentification”); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967) (“The practice of
showing suspects singly to persons for the purpose of identification, and not as part of a
lineup, has been widely condemned.”); Bibbins v. Baton Rouge, 489 F. Supp. 2d 562, 570
(M.D. La. 2007) (“An impermissibly suggestive identification . . . has a ‘permanency’ effect
to it in the sense that the eyewitness can never get back to the original, pre-tainted
memory.”).
82
Gambell, supra note 45, at 193.
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The most widely accepted police practice, a simultaneous line-up, is
to present the suspect in a line-up with other fillers.83 But in this
procedure, even if the police do not intentionally influence a lineup
procedure, there is still the risk that the witness will identify the
individual that most closely resembles the perpetrator.84 Even assuming
that law enforcement utilized the best practices available, jurors are
generally unequipped to effectively evaluate a witness’s testimony about
an identification.85
4.

Lack of Juror Understanding of These Variables

Unfortunately, most jurors are not aware of these variables and are
more likely to believe the testimony of an eyewitness instead of more
reliable evidence.86 In reality, eyewitness testimony is probably the most
compelling piece of evidence in the eyes of a juror even though it is one
of the least reliable.87 Thus, courts have traditionally used two types of

83
See Judges, supra note 71, at 254 (describing both live and photo array line-up
identifications as necessities of police procedure); see also Gambell, supra note 45, at 194–95
(comparing simultaneous lineups with sequential line-ups, where the police show the
witness potential suspects one at a time in order to force the witness to compare the person
he is viewing with his memory and not with the other individuals in a line-up).
84
Judges, supra note 71, at 255–56. Relative judgment occurs when “the witness
consciously compares various features of the members of the array and selects the
individual who most closely resembles the witness’s mental representation of the
perpetrator.” Id. at 255. See Wells & Seelau, supra note 71, at 768 (explaining that relative
judgment occurs when the eyewitness chooses the individual in the line-up who most
resembles her memory of the perpetrator in comparison with the other members of the
line-up).
85
See infra notes 86–88 and accompanying text (discussing the average juror’s ability to
evaluate eyewitness testimony).
86
See Loftus, supra note 3, at 2 (contending that courts often fail to provide jurors with
the necessary information that would enable them to make an informed decision); see also
Nancy Mehrkens Steblay, Jasmina Besirevic, Solomon M. Fulero & Bella Jimenez-Lorente,
The Effects of Pre-trial Publicity on Juror Verdicts: A Meta-Analytic Review, 23 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 219, 220 (1999) (discussing whether juries are more likely to convict when there has
been pre-trial publicity); see also Paula L. Hannaford-Agor, Valerie P. Hans, Nicole L. Mott
& G. Thomas Munsterman, Are Hung Juries a Problem?, NAT’L CENTER FOR ST. CTS. 1, 50
(2002),
http://www.ncsconline.org/WC/Publications/Res_Juries_HungJuriesProblem
Pub.pdf (discussing the amount of weight that jurors give to police, co-defendants,
eyewitnesses, informants, defendants, and experts).
87
See Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 352–53 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(acknowledging that jurors are strongly affected by the testimony of an eyewitness); see also
Devenport et al., supra note 69, at 346–47 (discussing psychological studies that explore
juror sensitivity to various factors). The studies conclude that the majority of survey
participants are sensitive to the effect of a cross-racial identification and exposure to a prior
photo-array, but most participants were not conscious of the effects of age and retention
interval. Id.
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safeguards to educate jurors on the dangers of eyewitness identification:
expert testimony and jury instructions.88
Psychological experts have the skills needed to explain and clarify
characteristics of memory that are counterintuitive and that most jurors
would not otherwise be able to understand.89 In addition, an expert may
be able to provide a framework for the average juror, ensuring that the
juror has all the requisite tools to evaluate the merits of an
identification.90 However, courts have failed to create a consistent
criteria to determine whether an expert should be permitted to testify in
a particular case.91 Specifically, judges who oppose expert testimony feel
that it invades the decision-making authority of the juror to determine

See Sheehan, supra note 3, at 664–65, 674 (discussing the advantages and
disadvantages of admitting expert testimony and suggesting that jury instructions are the
most effective way to educate jurors); see also Tanja Rapus Benton, Stephanie A. McDonnell,
Neil Thomas, David F. Ross & Nicholas Honerkamp, On the Admissibility of Expert
Testimony on Eyewitness Identification: A Legal and Scientific Evaluation, 2 TENN. J. L. & POL’Y
392, 404–05 (2006) (noting that ninety-eight percent of states take a discretionary approach
when deciding whether to admit an eyewitness expert and discussing each state’s rationale
for taking a specific approach); Steven I. Friedland, On Common Sense and the Evaluation of
Witness Credibility, 40 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 165, 173–74 (1990) (arguing that the jury system
is vital to a democratic society because the jury represents the community and speaks for
the community as a whole).
89
See Hunt, supra note 65, at 513 (describing the role of the expert in a jury trial and
explaining the potential value of permitting experts to educate jurors); Richard S.
Schmechel, Timothy P. O’Toole, Catherine Easterly & Elizabeth F. Loftus, Beyond the Ken?
Testing Jurors’ Understanding of Eyewitness Reliability Evidence, 46 JURIMETRICS J. 177, 180
(2006) (“Typically, eyewitness [identification] experts are prepared to testify in court about
the extent to which the research literature explains how a particular factor, considered
alone or in combination with others, likely would affect the reliability of an
identification.”).
90
See Mark S. Brodin, Behavioral Science Evidence in the Age of Daubert: Reflections of a
Skeptic, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 867, 889–91 (2005) (discussing the benefits of allowing an expert
to testify at trial and concluding that courts often preclude expert testimony at trial because
expert testimony “is unnecessary because an unassisted jury is perfectly capable of
weighing the weaknesses of eyewitness testimony after cross-examination by defense
counsel”); Fradella, supra note 50, at 24–25 (arguing that jury instructions are inadequate to
educate jurors on the complexities involved in eyewitness identification and providing
numerous reasons why expert testimony is the best method to accomplish the goal of
educating the jury).
91
See Cutler & Kovera, supra note 3, at 10–14 (indicating that recent DNA exonerations
have caused many judges to become more favorable towards expert testimony on
eyewitness identifications and mistaken identifications); Fradella, supra note 50, at 21–22
(discussing the inability of courts to agree on whether experts should be allowed to testify
about the complexities of eyewitness identification. But see Paul C. Gianelli, Ake v.
Oklahoma: The Right to Expert Assistance in a Post-Daubert, Post-DNA World, 89 CORNELL L.
REV. 1305, 1307 (2004) (contending that expert testimony favors the wealthy because
indigent defendants cannot afford to hire an expert).
88
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whether a witness is believable.92 Thus, judges who oppose the use of
experts may use jury instructions to inform jurors on the science of
memory.93
Jury instructions are generally permitted to educate jurors on the
dangers of eyewitness identification.94 Most courts acknowledge that
jurors simply do not have an adequate understanding of how memory
works to make an informed decision and feel more comfortable with an
instruction than with an expert.95 Jury instructions are also an
inexpensive and efficient way to address the dangers of eyewitness
identification.96 Opponents argue that judges decrease the credibility of
an eyewitness in the eyes of the jury by giving an instruction on only this
type of testimony.97 The Supreme Court’s struggle to account for the
92
Fradella, supra note 50, at 21; see also United States v. Lumpkin, 192 F.3d 280, 289 (2d
Cir. 1999) (“[I]n reviewing the use of expert testimony, we . . . look to see if it will usurp
either the role of the trial judge in instructing the jury as to the applicable law or the role of
the jury in applying that law to the facts before it.”) (quoting United States v. Duncan, 42
F.3d 97, 101 (2d Cir. 1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted); United States v. Hall, 165
F.3d 1095, 1107 (7th Cir. 1999) (“[T]he credibility of eyewitness testimony is generally not
an appropriate subject matter for expert testimony because it influences a critical function
of the jury—determining the credibility of witnesses.”); Jules Epstein, The Great Engine That
Couldn’t: Science, Mistaken Identifications, and the Limits of Cross-Examination, 36 STETSON L.
REV. 727, 727–28 (2007) (asserting that many judges believe cross-examination is the best
way to analyze whether an eyewitness identification is reliable and tracing this belief all the
way back to mid-eighteenth century England).
93
See infra notes 94–97 and accompanying text (discussing the strengths and weaknesses
of allowing jury instructions instead of expert witnesses).
94
See Simmonsen, supra note 39, at 1058–61, 1076 (discussing the justice system’s gradual
acceptance of eyewitness science and detailing the slow process that courts went through
to determine whether to permit expert testimony regarding eyewitness identification); see
also Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S.Ct. 716, 729 n.7 (2012) (listing the various states’
versions of eyewitness identification jury instructions); United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d
552, 558–559 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (creating one of the most widely used pattern jury instructions
for cases involving eyewitness identifications).
95
Simmonsen, supra note 39, at 1080; see also Neil P. Cohen, The Timing of Jury
Instructions, 67 TENN. L. REV. 681, 683 (2000) (“Jurors cannot perform their duties without
being instructed on the law they are to apply.”); Handberg, supra note 46, at 1061 (“[J]udges
are already in the habit of giving jury instructions, so they will find it easy to incorporate a
new instruction.”).
96
Simmonsen, supra note 39, at 1081; see also Handberg, supra note 46, at 1060–61 (calling
jury instructions a “low cost solution” because they may be administered with relative ease
at the conclusion of a trial and suggesting that the judge is the best party to deliver
guidelines on eyewitness identification to the jury because “the judge is nonpartisan and
his task is to help the jury perform its function [and] the jury intuitively looks to the judge
for guidance as to how it is supposed to behave”).
97
Sheehan, supra note 3, at 671; see also Conley v. State, 607 S.W.2d 328, 330 (Ark. 1980)
(refusing to overturn the trial court for not permitting a jury instruction because the
instruction contained comments on the evidence and concerned the weight of the
eyewitness testimony); Waller v. State, 581 S.W.2d 483, 484 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (stating
that a jury instruction singling out the eyewitness identification would be improper

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2012

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 47, No. 1 [2012], Art. 9

376

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47

complexities of eyewitness identification is illustrated in its reluctance to
incorporate scientific data into its approach over the past thirty years.98
B. The Supreme Court’s Jurisprudence and New Jersey’s Decision
Between 1967 and 1977, the Supreme Court established guidelines
that continue to govern the admissibility of an eyewitness identification
in most jurisdictions.99 In 2011, New Jersey became the first state to
significantly depart from the standard created by the Supreme Court. 100
Part II.B.1 reviews the slowly evolving jurisprudence of the Supreme
Court, and Part II.B.2 examines New Jersey’s departure from the
framework utilized by the Supreme Court.101
1.

Eyewitness Identification and the Supreme Court

In United States v. Wade, Justice Brennan wrote for the majority and
penned the oft quoted and perhaps prophetic line, “[t]he vagaries of
eyewitness identification are well-known; the annals of criminal law are
rife with instances of mistaken identification.”102 In this case, after
allegedly robbing a bank, two bank employees identified Wade in a lineup without the presence of his lawyer, and Wade claimed that his Sixth
Amendment rights had been violated.103 The Court held that a criminal
defendant has the right to counsel at a post-indictment line-up because

because it would concern the weight of the evidence); Handberg, supra note 46, at 1061
(asserting that most jury instructions are unintelligible to most jurors because they are
written to satisfy a legal standard and that “as the instructions become more legally
sophisticated, they become less understandable to the average person”).
98
See infra Part II.B (outlining the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on eyewitness
identification from the past thirty years).
99
See Richard A. Wise, Clifford S. Fishman & Martin A. Safer, How to Analyze the
Accuracy of Eyewitness Testimony in a Criminal Case, 42 CONN. L. REV. 435, 443 (2009) (noting
that the Supreme Court has not added to its eyewitness identification jurisprudence since
1977). In an 8-1 decision, the Supreme Court held that “[t]he fallibility of eyewitness
evidence does not, without the taint of improper state conduct, warrant a due process rule
requiring a trial court to screen such evidence for reliability before allowing the jury to
assess its creditworthiness.” Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S.Ct. 716, 728 (2012). A
defendant has adequate protections against erroneous identifications including the right to
counsel, compulsory process, cross-examination, trial by jury, the burden of proof, and jury
instructions. Id. at 728–29.
100
See infra Part II.B.2 (summarizing New Jersey’s revised approach).
101
See Part II.B (summarizing the Supreme Court’s eyewitness identification
jurisprudence and New Jersey’s recent departure from it).
102
United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 228 (1967). Brennan also recognized that
eyewitness evidence is “proverbially untrustworthy.” Id.
103
Id. at 220.
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of the potential for suggestiveness in line-up procedures.104 Further, a
pre-trial identification is inadmissible if the defendant was denied
counsel.105 The Court also held that a subsequent in-court identification
would not be suppressed if the prosecutor could show that the
identification was based on an independent source.106
In Stovall v. Denno, the perpetrator stabbed the victim eleven times,
placing the victim in critical condition.107 Not knowing whether the
victim would live, the police handcuffed the defendant and conducted a
show-up identification in the hospital room.108 The victim positively
identified the defendant, and the defendant argued that his due process
rights had been violated by the suggestive manner of the show-up
identification.109 The Court held that the show-up identification did not
violate the defendant’s due process rights because the identification
method was not “so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to
irreparable mistaken identification.”110 Thus, the Court created the
“totality of the circumstances” test to determine whether the
identification was unnecessarily suggestive.111
After five years, the Supreme Court decided Neil v. Biggers and again
weighed in on the identification discussion.112 In Biggers, a man
threatened the victim in her kitchen with a butcher knife and eventually
wrestled her to the ground.113 After the victim’s daughter began
screaming, the perpetrator led the victim two blocks away into the
woods and raped her.114 Seven months later after viewing numerous
suspects, the police conducted a show-up identification, and the victim
identified the defendant as the perpetrator.115 The Court held that the
identification was admissible unless there was a substantial likelihood of
misidentification.116 The Court resurrected and modified the two prong
104
Id. at 236–37. The Wade Court noted the importance of pre-trial identifications, as
eyewitnesses rarely change their mind or recant their former identification. Id. at 229.
105
Id. at 226.
106
Id. at 239–40.
107
Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 295 (1967).
108
Id.
109
Id. at 295–96.
110
Id. at 301–02.
111
Id. at 302.
112
Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 189 (1972).
113
Id. at 193–94. The lights were off in her home and the entire confrontation took place
at night. Id.
114
Id. at 194. See generally Elizabeth Hampson, Sari M. van Anders & Lucy I. Mullin, A
Female Advantage in the Recognition of Emotional Facial Expressions: Test of an Evolutionary
Hypothesis, 27 EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 27, 27 (2006) (concluding that women are
generally better at identifying emotional facial expressions than men).
115
Biggers, 409 U.S. at 194–95.
116
Id. at 198.
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due process analysis created in Stovall and Wade.117 However, the Court
distinguished itself from the Wade and Stovall courts by holding that the
suggestibility of an identification will be weighed against its reliability;
thus, the Court shifted its focus from suggestibility to reliability.118 The
totality of the circumstances framework includes five factors: (1) the
witness’s opportunity to view the perpetrator during the commission of
the crime, (2) the witness’ degree of attention, (3) the witness’s accuracy
in describing the criminal, (4) the witness’s confidence in identifying the
criminal, and (5) the amount of time between the crime and
confrontation.119
Today most courts follow some version of the standard established
in Manson v. Brathwaite.120 In Manson, Glover approached and knocked
on the door of a known drug dealer while working undercover.121 After
opening the door twelve to eighteen inches, the man accepted cash from
Glover, closed the door, and subsequently re-opened the door to deliver
two glassine bags to Glover.122 Glover described the man to an officer at
headquarters who retrieved a picture of the defendant.123 Glover
identified the defendant as the man who had sold him drugs.124 The
Court declared, “[r]eliability is the linchpin in determining the
admissibility of an identification testimony. . . . ”125 Reiterating its
holding in Biggers, the Court held that an unnecessarily suggestive
eyewitness identification will not be excluded per se if the identification

Id. at 199.
Id. at 198–99. See generally State v. Orlando, 634 A.2d 1039, 1043 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1993) (providing an example of a court utilizing the Manson approach).
119
Biggers, 409 U.S. at 199; see also John C. Brigham, Adina W. Wasserman & Christian A.
Meissner, Disputed Eyewitness Identification Evidence: Important Legal and Scientific Issues, 36
CT. REV. 12, 17 (1999) (arguing that opportunity to observe the criminal and the length
between the crime and the identification are the only two of the Biggers factors that can be
connected to the accuracy of an identification); Gambell, supra note 45, at 208–12
(discussing the circuit split over how to interpret Manson and also surveying the various
approaches state courts have taken to this issue); Wells & Bradfield, supra note 70, at 361–62
(proving that suggestive police behavior may inflate witness confidence and that the
witness’s memory of the event may be altered, including his view of the attacker and the
degree of focus that the witness placed on the perpetrator).
120
See generally Gambell, supra note 45, at 206–14 (discussing the Biggers test and the role
it has played in the courts nationally); Timothy P. O’Toole & Giovanna Shay, Manson v.
Brathwaite Revisited: Towards a New Rule of Decision for Due Process Challenges to Eyewitness
Identification Procedures, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 109 (2006) (arguing that Manson does not protect
the Due Process rights of criminal defendants and suggesting a more effective approach)
121
Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 100–01 (1977).
122
Id. at 100.
123
Id. at 101.
124
Id.
125
Id. at 114.
117
118
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is otherwise sufficiently reliable.126 The Court held that an
identification’s reliability should be measured by weighing the Biggers
factors against the suggestiveness of the procedure.127 Most states have
adopted some version of the test announced in Manson; however, New
Jersey became the first state to significantly depart from the Supreme
Court’s method in State v. Henderson.128
2.

Eyewitness Identification and New Jersey’s Supreme Court

On August 24, 2011, New Jersey became the first state to reject the
Manson test in favor of a more pro-defendant eyewitness identification
framework.129 On January 1, 2003, Rodney Harper and James Womble
ushered in the New Year by drinking champagne and wine and smoking
crack cocaine at Womble’s girlfriend’s apartment.130 Sometime after 2:30
a.m., George Clark and another man armed with a gun forcefully entered
the apartment in search of $160 owed to Clark by Harper.131 Clark led
Harper into another room while the unidentified man stood in a “small,
narrow, dark hallway” and aimed the gun at Womble, telling him not to
move.132 Womble heard a gunshot, found Harper severely injured, and
volunteered to retrieve the money for Clark.133 Harper died from the
gunshot wound nine days later.134
Detective Louis Ruiz and Investigator Randall MacNair interviewed
Womble the following day.135 Initially, Womble was uncooperative
because he feared that the perpetrators would harm his elderly father,
but he eventually made an identification after one of the officers told
126
Id.; see also Gambell, supra note 45, at 214–15 (explaining that the Supreme Court’s
current approach makes it extremely difficult for an identification to be excluded because
defense counsel must show that: (1) the police utilized an “impermissibly suggestive”
identification procedure, and; (2) even if it was suggestive the identification may still be
admissible if the State can show the identification is reliable under the totality of the
circumstances).
127
Manson, 432 U.S. at 114; see Gambell, supra note 45, at 206 (discussing policy reasons
for adopting the totality of the circumstance test). See generally Gary L. Wells & Dean S.
Quinlivan, Suggestive Eyewitness Identification Procedures and the Supreme Court’s Reliability
Test in Light of Eyewitness Science: 30 Years Later, 33 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 1 (2009).
128
State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 878–79 (N.J. 2011).
129
Id. at 918.
130
Id. at 879. “Womble smoked two bags of crack cocaine with his girlfriend in the hours
before the shooting; the two also consumed one bottle of champagne and one bottle of
wine; the lighting was ‘pretty dark’ in the hallway where Womble and defendant
interacted; defendant shoved Womble during the incident.” Id. at 882.
131
Id.
132
Id.
133
Id.
134
Id.
135
Id.
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him, “[j]ust do what you have to do, and we’ll be out of here.”136 In a
photographic array of eight pictures, Womble easily discounted five of
the photos and eventually dismissed a sixth, but he struggled to choose
from the remaining two photos.137 After considerable deliberation,
Womble identified Henderson; however, Henderson argued that the
witness mistakenly identified him as a result of suggestive procedures.138
At the Wade pre-trial hearing, the trial court found that the
identification was admissible in spite of any suggestibility because it was
reliable under the totality of the circumstances, and there was no
substantial likelihood of misidentification.139 The appellate division held
that the identification procedure was impermissibly suggestive under
the first prong of the Manson test and remanded for a new Wade
hearing.140 The New Jersey Supreme Court evaluated the evidence
proffered by the parties and amici and rejected the traditional Manson
test in favor of an approach more consistent with the scientific
evidence.141
The New Jersey Supreme Court held that courts should consider the
following non-exhaustive list of system variables to determine whether
an identification is unnecessarily suggestive: (1) blind administration,
(2) pre-identification instructions, (3) line-up construction, (4) feedback,
(5) recording confidence, (6) multiple viewings, (7) show-ups, (8) private
actors, and (9) other identifications.142 The New Jersey Court went on to
explain that if a court finds evidence of suggestiveness in the system
variables, it should then consider the following non-exhaustive list of
estimator variables to determine whether an identification is reliable:
(1) stress, (2) weapon focus, (3) duration, (4) distance and lighting,
(5) witness characteristics, (6) characteristics of perpetrator, (7) memory
decay, (8) race-bias, (9) opportunity to view the criminal at the time of
the crime, (10) degree of attention, (11) accuracy of prior description of
the criminal, (12) level of certainty demonstrated at the confrontation,
and (13) the time between the crime and the confrontation.143 The
defendant must proffer evidence that one of the identification
136
Id. at 879, 881. “Womble did not recant his identification, but during the Wade hearing
he testified that he felt as though Detective Weber was ‘nudging’ him to choose defendant's
photo, and ‘that there was pressure’ to make a choice.” Id. at 881.
137
Id.
138
Id. at 877.
139
Id. at 882.
140
Id. at 883–84. At the new trial, the parties produced over 360 exhibits, including 200
published scientific studies, and also called seven eyewitness identification expert
witnesses and three law professors. Id. at 884–85.
141
Id. at 878–79, 918.
142
Id. at 920–21.
143
Id. at 921–22.
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procedures in the system was suggestive in order to obtain a pre-trial
hearing.144 A court may then evaluate both the system and estimator
variables and determine whether the identification is admissible.145
The topic of eyewitness identification presents significant and
unique challenges to the judicial system because of the complexity of the
variables that influence reliability.146 The problem only worsens when a
jury is the arbiter of whether an identification is reliable.147 Moreover,
the Supreme Court has not incorporated reliable scientific data into its
approach.148 Nonetheless, New Jersey’s departure from the Supreme
Court’s Manson framework is a giant step in the right direction.149
III. ANALYSIS
The legal system’s reluctance to incorporate thirty years of scientific
research into its method of analyzing eyewitness identification has
injured hundreds of criminal defendants and discredited the criminal
justice system.150 Criminal defense attorneys have filed motion after
motion, and researchers have conducted study after study, yet the
current Manson framework has remained virtually unchanged.151 Recent
DNA exonerations illustrate the failure of the Manson approach to ensure
reliable identification procedures, deter improper police practices, and
prepare a jury to make an informed decision.152 Although courts have
utilized the Manson approach for over thirty years, New Jersey’s model
incorporates reliable scientific research, deters suggestive police practices
Id. at 922.
Id.
146
See supra Part II.A.1–3 (discussing the variables that influence memory).
147
See supra Part II.A.4 (considering the average juror’s ability to evaluate eyewitness
identification).
148
See supra Part II.B.1 (providing a brief history of the Supreme Court’s approach to
eyewitness identification testimony).
149
See supra Part II.B.2 (describing New Jersey’s departure from the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence). But see Massachusetts v. Walker, 953 N.E.2d 195, 209–10 (Mass. 2011)
(declining to follow New Jersey’s approach when “the defendant did not move to suppress
the identification and where the issue is whether the defendant’s attorney was ineffective
in failing to do so”).
150
See GARRETT, supra note 4, at 6–11 (reviewing the cases of 250 exonerated individuals
and concluding that the overwhelming majority of those cases could have been prevented
by amended procedures).
151
See Wells & Quinlivan, supra note 127, at 1-2 (advocating for a change in the Supreme
Court’s approach to eyewitness identification).
152
See NEUFELD & SCHECK, supra note 4, at 9 (explaining how the DNA exonerations from
the past thirty years are our best reminder that the system is not working correctly); Wells
& Quinlivan, supra note 127, at 1–2 (explaining that all of the exoneration cases had to pass
through the Manson framework, providing evidence that Manson is not keeping out
erroneous identifications).
144
145
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without providing an unnecessary burden on law enforcement, and uses
jury instructions to equip juries with the understanding necessary to
properly evaluate the data.153 New Jersey’s model is not immune from
criticism, but it is a step in the right direction and ultimately is in the best
interest of law enforcement, prosecutors, and defense attorneys.154
First, Part III.A of this Note analyzes the weaknesses inherent in the
Manson approach to evaluating eyewitness identification.155 Second, Part
III.B evaluates New Jersey’s attempt to incorporate scientific data, deter
suggestive police procedures, and address the limitations of jurors.156
Last, Part III.C considers the overall effect of New Jersey’s approach on
the criminal justice system as a whole.157
A. Assessing the Adequacy of the Traditional Manson Approach to
Eyewitness Identification
Although Neil v. Biggers was decided in 1972, most studies on
eyewitness identification were published after 1975.158 As a result, the
five factors introduced in Biggers are largely under-inclusive and out of
touch with scientific reality.159 Consequently, the Manson method of
weighing the Biggers factors against the corrupting effect of a suggestive
identification procedure fails to incorporate modern scientific findings
into its analysis, deter suggestive police procedures, and provide juries
with the information needed to make the best decision.160

State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 918–19 (N.J. 2011).
See infra Part III.B (exploring the advantages and disadvantages to law enforcement,
prosecutors, and defense attorneys).
155
See infra Part III.A (arguing that scientific research has rendered the Manson
framework inadequate and in need of revision).
156
See infra Part III.B (explaining that New Jersey’s approach is the best attempt to
address the scientific data).
157
See infra Part III.C (suggesting that New Jersey’s method benefits everyone involved).
158
See Gambell supra note 45, at 192 (suggesting that the large amount of research on
memory has rendered several of the Biggers factors unreliable). See generally supra note 119
and accompanying text (explaining why three of the Biggers factors are no longer reliable).
159
Gambell, supra note 45, at 220–21. Two of the factors have since been verified by
scientific data, but three have little correlation with accuracy. Id. For example, Biggers
includes eyewitness confidence as a factor even though it has no bearing on the accuracy of
an identification. Id. Eighty-seven percent of psychologists affirmed that they would
testify in court that confidence does not indicate accuracy. Id.
160
See supra note 81 and accompanying text (explaining that courts rarely find an
identification procedure as unnecessarily suggestive). See generally supra note 86 and
accompanying text (suggesting that the average juror is not aware of the dangers
accompanying eyewitness testimony).
153
154
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Manson’s Test Fails to Deter Suggestive Police Practices and May
Reward Suggestive Procedures

Manson’s two prong test fails to deter improper police practices and
may sometimes even reward suggestive police procedures.161 A court
will not proceed to the reliability prong of the analysis until it decides
that the police utilized a suggestive procedure; however, at this point the
damage has been done because a suggestive procedure may have
already influenced three of the five reliability factors.162 For example,
confirmatory feedback received during the retention phase causes the
witness to solidify that memory as confirmed by the outside influence;
thus, the witness’s degree of certainty will increase in proportion to the
suggestiveness of the procedure.163 Second, a witness’s opportunity to
view the culprit may be distorted if the witness inaccurately perceives
the amount of time the witness had to view the perpetrator or the
distance the witness was away from the perpetrator or receives
confirmatory feedback in the process.164 Third, a witness’s ability to
recall his degree of attention during the commission of the crime may be
distorted by suggestive procedures because “attention” is purely a
subjective variable that may not be measured against other objective
criteria.165
The Court in Manson did not want to adopt a per se exclusionary rule
that would exclude an identification altogether if the procedure was
suggestive.166 Understandably, some identifications may still be reliable
161
See supra Part II.A.3 (outlining the most commonly used police procedures and
indicating which variables have the potential to be influenced by suggestive procedures).
162
See Wells & Quinlivan, supra note 127, at 9 (suggesting that there is nothing inherently
flawed in adopting a two prong test; however, the criteria upon which the two prongs rest
lends itself to encouraging suggestive procedures).
163
See Simmonsen, supra note 39, at 1052–54 (stating that confidence should not be used
in the analysis because there is no correlation between confidence and accuracy and citing
specific studies showing that suggestive remarks confirming an initial identification makes
witnesses more confident that their original identification was correct).
164
See Wells & Quinlivan, supra note 127, at 9–10 (discussing a phenomenon known as
“visual hindsight illusion” that occurs when a viewer mistakenly assumes the identity of a
person); see also Brigham, supra note 119, at 17 (suggesting that opportunity to observe the
criminal, if not distorted by suggestive procedures, is one of the Biggers factors that can be
connected to the accuracy of an identification).
165
See Gambell, supra note 45, at 198–99 (explaining how violence and high levels of
stress can narrow a witness’s attention and trigger defense mechanisms potentially
impairing a witness’s ability to accurately identify the perpetrator and hinder the witness
from recalling relevant details about the crime); see also Handberg, supra note 46, at 1023
(asserting that jurors generally do not understand how stress and other objective factors
influence a witness’s ability to make an accurate and reliable identification).
166
See Gambell, supra note 45, at 214–15 (suggesting that a per se exclusionary rule would
alleviate many of the potential dangers that defendants face from eyewitness identification
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even though the procedure utilized was flawed.167 However, trial judges
rarely exclude an identification because of suggestiveness, assuming that
thorough cross-examination and the discernment of the jury will weed
Thus, the totality of the
out any erroneous identifications.168
circumstances test vests trial judges with the discretion to exclude or
admit a suggestive identification but fails to offer clear guidelines for
Consequently,
when an identification should be suppressed.169
normative judicial practice provides little incentive for police to change
their procedures because police misconduct is rarely cited as grounds to
exclude an identification.170
2.

The Biggers Test, as Utilized by Manson, is Under-Inclusive and
Neglects the Scientific Data

Courts should consider the factors discussed in New Jersey’s
decision in addition to the five factors established in Biggers because
three of the Biggers factors rely on the witness’s self-reporting.171
Currently, courts must rely mainly on the witness’s recollection or
and comparing the failure to exclude suggestive identifications to “allowing a coerced or
involuntary confession”).
167
See State v. Orlando, 634 A.2d 1039, 1043–44 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993) (offering
an extreme example of an identification made by a kidnapped victim who viewed her
perpetrator for six hours and her identification was deemed reliable even though the police
utilized an unnecessarily suggestive procedure).
168
See Epstein, supra note 92, at 727–29, 751 (providing that cross-examination is not
necessarily the best way to analyze whether an eyewitness identification is reliable even
though many judges believe it is the best method); Sheehan, supra note 3, at 665
(concluding that cross examination and the jury serve the purpose of exposing a dishonest
or biased witness, but these two safeguards are “ill equipped to confront an honest but
mistaken witness who, because she is giving testimony she believes to be true, will not
display the demeanor of someone who is lying”); see also Perry v. New Hamphire, 132 S.Ct.
716, 721 (2012) (“When no improper law enforcement activity is involved . . . it suffices to
test reliability through . . . the presence of counsel at postindictment lineups, vigorous
cross-examination, protective rules of evidence, and jury instructions on both the fallibility
of eyewitness identification and the requirement that guilt be proved beyond a reasonable
doubt.”).
169
Gambell, supra note 45, at 215–16; see TerBeek, supra note 11, at 46, 51 (explaining that
the Supreme Court’s lack of consistency has resulted in numerous cases where innocent
people have been imprisoned and encouraging the Supreme Court to “reverse[] its stale
eyewitness jurisprudence [so] that the problems inherent in eyewitness identifications can
be fully remedied”).
170
Kruse, supra note 12, at 670–71 (“A suggestive identification procedure thus becomes
the source of the very factors that are used by a judge to test its reliability in the post hoc
setting of a completed investigation, effectively insulating an unduly suggestive eyewitness
identification from legal challenge.”).
171
State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 918 (N.J. 2011); see Gambell, supra note 45, at 217
(arguing that the Supreme Court did not intend for the Biggers factors to be an exhaustive
list and that courts should be willing to consider other factors in their analysis).
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impression of the event when evaluating the witness’s opportunity to
view the perpetrator, degree of attention, and confidence.172 But in
reality, the witness may or may not be aware of how the presence of
other factors may distort memory; thus, a court is at the mercy of the
witness’s self-reporting.173
First, contrary to public opinion, the stress of a situation does not
focus a witness’s attention on the face of the perpetrator thereby
increasing its accuracy.174 A witness’s attention will be negatively
affected by the overall stress level, the presence of a weapon, and the
amount of violence.175 In these situations, an individual’s survival
instincts focus his or her attention on self-preservation, which actually
causes the witness to pay less attention to the perpetrator than the
witness would without the presence of such factors.176 Second, a
confident eyewitness is no more likely to be correct than a witness who is
not confident.177 To say it another way, the scientific community agrees
that an eyewitness’s confidence does not increase or decrease
accuracy.178 Even though confidence is among the most unreliable
factors, juries commonly believe a confident eyewitness even if it means
ignoring hard scientific data.179 Third, a court should consider the
witness’s opportunity to view the perpetrator, but not to the exclusion of
other relevant factors such as: the proximity of the witness to the event,

172
See supra Part II.B.1 (summarizing the Supreme Court’s current approach to
eyewitness identification).
173
Henderson, 27 A.3d at 896–900; see Simmonsen, supra note 39, at 1048–49 (suggesting
that most eyewitnesses and jurors do not understand the fundamentals of how memory
works); Loftus, supra note 37, at § 2-2, 12–13 (showing how each of these three stages of
memory may be affected by the presence of different factors).
174
See Gambell, supra note 45, at 198–99 (explaining that high levels of stress inhibit an
individual’s ability to confront a threatening situation); see also Handberg, supra note 46, at
1023 (indicating that high amounts of stress are more likely to result in a misidentification).
175
See Sheehan, supra note 3, at 656–57 (providing a thorough examination of the effect of
violence of the eyewitness).
176
See supra notes 46–47 and accompanying text (discussing the effects of violence, stress,
and weapon focus on an eyewitness); see also Gambell, supra note 45, at 198–99 (arguing
that a weapon has a magnetic presence that draws a witness’s attention away from the face
of the perpetrator and toward the weapon itself, making it more difficult for a witness to
make a positive identification or describe the perpetrator at a later date).
177
See supra notes 57–59 and accompanying text (explaining that a confident eyewitness
is not more reliable than a witness who is not as confident and suggesting that confidence
may be affected by post-event information and interactions).
178
See supra notes 57–59 and accompanying text (illustrating how the scientific
community is in agreement on this issue).
179
See generally Survey, supra note 3, at 1–6, 11–12 (citing surveys showing what most
jurors believe about eyewitness identification).
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the lighting conditions, the duration of the event, any visual defects
inherent in the witness, and the race of the witness and perpetrator.180
3.

Manson Does Not Account for Jurors’ Inability to Accurately Process
Eyewitness Data

Manson fails to adequately prepare a jury to make an informed
decision.181 Because courts rarely exclude a suggestive procedure, most
eyewitness evidence is presented to the jury despite its potentially
adverse effects in determining whether the identification should be
admissible.182 Unfortunately, the average juror will often believe an
eyewitness even if the eyewitness is contradicted by more reliable
evidence.183 Studies suggest that eyewitness evidence is the most
compelling to the juror and that jurors are unaware of the implications of
extrinsic evidence on the identification.184 Without jury instructions or
expert testimony, jurors do not have the requisite knowledge to make an
informed decision.185
In conclusion, the Manson Court could not have known the
implications of its decision before many of the scientific studies on
memory and eyewitness identification were published thirty years
ago.186 However, recent DNA exonerations and modern scientific data
illustrate that the two prong Manson test generally fails to preclude
wrongful police procedures, include relevant scientific research, and
inform juries of factors to consider in making their decision.187 As a

See Gambell, supra note 45, at 218–19 (arguing that courts should not consider this
factor in isolation because other estimator variables impact how a witness remembers his
opportunity to view the suspect).
181
See supra notes 86–98 and accompanying text (exploring the general knowledge of
jurors and discussing the benefits of both jury instructions and expert testimony).
182
See Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 352 (1981) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(acknowledging that jurors are strongly affected by the testimony of an eyewitness);
Devenport et al., supra note 69, at 347–48 (suggesting that jurors will ignore more credible
evidence in light of eyewitness testimony).
183
Devenport et al., supra note 69, at 347–48.
184
See Sheehan, supra note 3, at 664 (stating that eyewitness evidence is often the most
compelling to the average juror notwithstanding the existence of contrary more reliable
evidence).
185
See supra notes 86–98 and accompanying text (discussing the advantages and
disadvantages of jury instructions and expert testimony).
186
See Gambell, supra note 45, at 217–18 (arguing that the Court did not intend for the
Biggers factors to be an exhaustive list because it knew that science would change the way
we understand memory).
187
State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 878 (N.J. 2011); see GARRETT, supra note 4, at 48
(reviewing the cases of the 250 exonerated individuals and explaining that “suggestive
identification procedures and unreliable identifications” were two recurring problems).
180
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result, the New Jersey Supreme Court resolved to confront these
weaknesses in its landmark decision State v. Henderson.188
B. New Jersey’s Approach Addresses the Weaknesses Inherent in the Manson
Framework
On August 24, 2011, the New Jersey Supreme Court attempted to
resolve the weaknesses inherent in the Manson decision in State v.
Henderson.189 To do so, the New Jersey Supreme Court adopted a new
standard for assessing the reliability of an eyewitness identification.190
The goal of this new test was to protect the rights of criminal defendants
from police misconduct and uninformed jurors while allowing the
prosecution to introduce relevant evidence at trial.191 This approach
differs from Manson in two ways: (1) the defendant must offer only some
evidence of suggestiveness, triggered by a system variable, in order to
receive a pre-trial hearing, at which time the judge will examine all
relevant system and estimator variables; and (2) jury instructions should
be crafted so that the jury can accurately evaluate identification
evidence.192
1.

New Jersey’s Test Deters Suggestive Police Practices While
Simultaneously Protecting the Interests of Law Enforcement and
Prosecutors

New Jersey’s approach protects defendants by deterring suggestive
police procedures and protects the interests of law enforcement and
prosecutors by avoiding bright line rules that suppress eyewitness
identifications.193 New Jersey sought to deter police by providing for a

Henderson, 27 A.3d at 918.
Id. at 919.
190
Id. at 878–79.
191
Id. at 918–19.
192
Id. at 919–20. After the defendant has showed some evidence of suggestiveness, the
State must offer proof showing that the identification is reliable. Id. at 920. Then, the
burden shifts to the defendant to prove a “very substantial likelihood of irreparable
misidentification.” Id. After examining the relevant evidence, if the court decides that the
defendant has carried his burden and demonstrated a “very substantial likelihood of
irreparable misidentification,” the court should suppress the identification; if not, the court
should craft appropriate jury instructions. Id. At any point, the court may abandon the
hearing if it feels like the defendant’s claim is groundless. Id.
193
See Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 112–13 (1977) (indicating that the Supreme
Court wanted to avoid a per se exclusionary rule if an identification was procured with
some suggestiveness); Henderson, 27 A.3d at 922 (following the Supreme Court’s approach
in Manson and avoiding a per se rule that would exclude an identification if the
identification was accompanied by any suggestiveness). The court reasoned that,
188
189
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more probing investigation into certain procedures that are within the
State’s control.194 Although suggestive procedures may continue to
affect the same estimator variables, an analysis that includes the
additional factors will make it unlikely that the identification will be
Most estimator variables operate
corrupted by suggestiveness.195
independently of the criminal justice system; thus, the reason for the
distinction between system and estimator variables.196 For example,
stress, weapon focus, duration, distance, lighting, witness characteristics,
characteristics of the perpetrator, memory decay, and race-bias cannot be
significantly altered by the intentional or unintentional actions of law
enforcement.197
Even if the defendant offers proof of suggestiveness, an
identification will not be suppressed unless the defendant can show a
very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.198 Although
judges continue to hold a large amount of discretion, the New Jersey
approach provides judges with much clearer guidelines for when an
identification should be excluded.199 Also, at a pre-trial Wade hearing, a
court will give the prosecution an opportunity to show why the
identification is reliable despite a showing of suggestiveness.200 By
avoiding a per se exclusionary rule, prosecutors will have much less
incentive to cover up the mistakes of law enforcement, and defense
attorneys will have a forum to voice their concerns.201 At the same time,
common police practices will improve because judges will have a greater
opportunity to probe further into suggestive procedures during the Wade
hearing, and certain procedures are considered inherently suspect.202

“Although the approach might yield greater deterrence, it could also lead to the loss of a
substantial amount of reliable evidence.” Id. at 922.
194
See Henderson, 27 A.3d at 920–21, 923 (stating that courts should consider the following
system variables when evaluating suggestiveness: blind administration, pre-identification
instructions, line-up construction, feedback, recording confidence, multiple viewings,
show-ups, private actors, and any other identifications made).
195
Id. at 922–23.
196
Id. at 904.
197
Id. at 904–07 (stating that these variables offer a more objective approach for courts to
follow because they are not as easily influenced by the intentional or unintentional actions
of law enforcement); see also Gambell, supra note 45, at 198–200 (giving examples of
estimator variables including: visual acuity, depth perception, darkness adaptation, color
blindness, stress, presence of a weapon, cross-racial dynamic, and memory alterations).
198
Henderson, 27 A.3d at 920.
199
Id. at 878.
200
Id. at 920.
201
Id. at 922.
202
Id.

https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol47/iss1/9

Zerkle: I Never Forget a Face: New Jersey Sets the Standard in Eyewitnes

2012]

I Never Forget a Face

389

New Jersey’s approach also incorporates reliable scientific data while
protecting the interests of the parties involved.203
2.

New Jersey Incorporated Scientific Data by Adding Eight New
Factors

New Jersey’s approach incorporates modern scientific research on
the way memory works, including eight additional estimator
variables.204 Although courts, by necessity, will continue to rely on
witness self-reporting, this approach enables the court to evaluate the
factors that may have affected a witness’s experience.205 In addition, the
three Biggers factors, which are easily manipulated, may be evaluated in
light of the other estimator and system variables, instead of in
isolation.206 For example, the witness’s degree of attention will be
considered alongside stress, the presence of a weapon, and race-bias.207
A judge may choose to place little weight on a confident eyewitness after
analyzing the other estimator and system variables.208 And the witness’s
opportunity to view the event will be evaluated in conjunction with the
lighting, duration, and distance from the event.209 New Jersey’s test not
only takes into account modern scientific data, it also attempts to equip
jurors with the requisite tools to understand the data.210
3.

New Jersey’s Test Accounts for the Limited Knowledge of the Juror

New Jersey’s decision takes into account jurors’ limitations by
requiring a judge to educate the jury on relevant estimator variables

203
See infra Part III.B.2 (analyzing New Jersey’s decision to incorporate modern scientific
data).
204
Henderson, 27 A.3d at 921.
205
Id. at 904; see Wells & Quinlivan, supra note 127, at 9–12 (expressing concern over the
Manson Court’s decision to rely so heavily on “retrospective self-reports” and explaining
that “[p]art of the problem is that retrospective self-reports are highly malleable in
response to even slight changes in context (e.g., who is asking the question), the social
desirability of the responses, the need to appear consistent, and reinterpretations of the
past based on new events”).
206
See Henderson, 27 A.3d at 921–22 (adding eight additional estimator variables to the
existing five Biggers factors and stating that New Jersey courts should consider them all
together).
207
Id.
208
See id. (providing an approach that allows a judge to evaluate the entire situation
instead of only the five Biggers factors).
209
Id.
210
See id. at 925–26 (requiring the Criminal Practice Committee and the Committee on
Model Criminal Jury Charges to create revised jury instructions incorporating the findings
from its decision in Henderson).
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through jury instructions.211 Although jurors are the final arbitrators of
guilt or innocence, the admissibility of an identification no longer
depends on the lay-person’s understanding of how memory works.212
There is no doubt that eyewitness identification will continue to be an
extremely convincing piece of evidence, but these instructions will
provide a framework by which jurors can process the data they are
given.213 In summary, New Jersey has modified the Manson test by
incorporating modern scientific data, which helps prevent suggestive
police procedures and educates jurors.214 Although this decision is a step
in the right direction, it is not without its weaknesses.
C. Criticisms of the New Jersey Approach
Critics contend that New Jersey’s approach is overly burdensome on
law enforcement, the judicial system, and prosecutors.215 However, Part
III.C.1 discusses the advantages and disadvantages for law
enforcement.216 Part III.C.2 explains that the long-term benefits of an
approach like the one adopted by New Jersey outweighs the initial
burden on the judiciary.217 Part III.C.3 analyzes New Jersey’s decision to
adopt all five of the Biggers factors.218
1.

The Burden on Law Enforcement is De Minimus

New Jersey’s decision places a greater burden on law enforcement,
requiring time, administrative inconvenience, and additional training.219
However, this burden is outweighed by the need to protect the wrongly
accused and ensure the accuracy of the criminal justice system.220 For
211
See id. at 924–25 (requiring the use of jury instructions, but also allowing the use of
expert testimony in appropriate circumstances).
212
Id. at 924. “But we do not rely on jurors to divine rules themselves or glean them from
cross-examination or summation. Even with matters that may be considered intuitive,
courts provide focused jury instructions.” Id.
213
Id.
214
Id. at 878–79.
215
Id. at 914–16, 927.
216
See infra Part III.C.1 (arguing that the burden is relatively small and, ultimately, New
Jersey’s reform is in the best interest of law enforcement).
217
See infra Part III.C.2 (exploring the ramifications of this decision on the judiciary and
once again determining that the benefits outweigh the costs).
218
See infra III.C.3 (questioning and evaluating New Jersey’s decision to include all five of
the Biggers factors).
219
See Fact Sheet, supra note 4 (providing examples of procedures that require extra time
but will help eliminate erroneous identifications).
220
See 250 Exonerated, supra note 4 (finding that the 250 exonerated individuals spent an
average of thirteen years in prison before they were exonerated and concluding that the
cost of reform is worth the inconvenience).
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example, blind administration requires the time of an administrator who
is not involved in the investigation and does not know which person is
the suspect.221 Constructing fair line-ups by making sure that the
members of the line-up are similar in attire and physical appearance will
cost police the time and effort it takes to find suitable fillers.222
Minimizing the use of show-up identifications may inconvenience police
because of the relative ease by which a show-up is administered;
however, taking the time and effort to organize a line-up generally
outweighs the need for administrative efficiency because of the inherent
suggestiveness of show-ups.223 Eliminating feedback and multiple
viewings, administering pre-lineup instructions, and recording the
confidence of the witness are reforms that may be implemented with
relative ease.224 In sum, the harm prevented by implementing these extra
safeguards outweighs the relatively minimal strain on law
enforcement.225 The harm prevented also offsets the inconvenience to
the judiciary.226
2.

The Long Term Benefits Outweigh the Initial Burden on the
Judiciary

Permitting a defendant to obtain a pre-trial hearing will consume
judicial time and resources.227 Although these hearings may require
more time and resources than the Manson test, the benefits of ensuring
an identification’s reliability outweigh the burdens.228 However, in the
cases in which an identification is in question, the judge may dismiss the

See supra notes 78–79 and accompanying text (explaining that although blind
administration requires extra effort, it is one of the easiest reforms for law enforcement to
implement).
222
See supra notes 68–74 and accompanying text (discussing the dangers that arise when
police fail to construct a line-up with physically similar individuals).
223
See supra notes 80–82 and accompanying text (explaining that although a show-up is
easily administered, the procedure itself is inherently suggestive).
224
State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 896–901 (N.J. 2011); see Fact Sheet, supra note 4
(offering other suggestions for eyewitness identification reform).
225
See supra Part III.C.1 (explaining why the burden on law enforcement is relatively
small).
226
See infra Part III.C.2 (arguing that the burden on the judiciary is outweighed by
ensuring that innocent individuals are not wrongly convicted).
227
Henderson, 27 A.3d at 923 (“[W]e are mindful of the practical impact of today’s ruling.
Because defendants will now be free to explore a broader range of estimator variables at
pretrial hearings to assess the reliability of an identification, those hearings will become
more intricate.”).
228
Id. at 878–79 (“The changes outlined in this decision are significant because eyewitness
identifications bear directly on guilt or innocence. At stake is the very integrity of the
criminal justice system and the courts’ ability to conduct fair trials.”).
221
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hearing at any time if the defense does not have a legitimate claim.229 In
addition, a thorough investigation into an identification’s reliability may
avoid confusion later in the trial and ultimately ensure that the guilty
party is not still roaming the streets.230 Moreover, research shows that
criminal defendants will be less likely to reoffend if they believe they
have been treated fairly by the system.231 The wrongful convictions of
the past thirty years are reminders of the high cost of admitting an
erroneous identification: the innocent lose their liberty and the guilty go
free.232 Nevertheless, New Jersey’s new test would be more accurate if
the court had excluded two of the Biggers factors.233
3.

Two of the Biggers Factors Have Little Objective Scientific Value

Although New Jersey incorporated modern scientific findings into
its approach to eyewitness testimony, it included two factors from
Biggers that have little objective value: degree of attention and
eyewitness confidence.234 Although these two factors are part of the
Supreme Court’s original test, they are no longer relevant to a reliability
inquiry because the additional factors make them obsolete.235
Concededly, a witness’s credibility is implicated if he or she admits to
not paying attention; however, the reverse is not necessarily true.236 For
example, even if an eyewitness claims a certain level of attention, a court
will confirm or discount that testimony based on other factors such as
the presence of a weapon, amount of stress (implicated by amount of
violence), and duration of the event.237 Like degree of attention,

Id. at 920.
See, e.g., Troy, supra note 6 (providing a case in which there was a doubt as to whether
the defendant was guilty, partly because several of the eyewitnesses later expressed
hesitancy about their identification of the defendant).
231
See supra note 56 (discussing the high rate of incarceration in the United States and
arguing that rehabilitation is not a central focus in our prison system).
232
See supra note 152 and accompanying text (arguing that the current Manson
framework is partly to blame for the high rate of wrongful convictions).
233
See infra Part III.C.3 (explaining that two of the Biggers factors have very little objective
value).
234
See supra note 119 (noting the circuit split over how to interpret the Biggers factors).
235
See State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 921–22 (adopting the five Biggers factors because
the New Jersey Court felt as if the overlap was not harmful to the additional eight factors).
236
See Wells & Bradfield, supra note 70, at 374–75 (“[A]s long as the eyewitness comes
across strongly on some or most of the five Biggers’ criteria, it is assumed that the
suggestive procedure was not problematic.”).
237
Henderson, 27 A.3d at 921–22.
229
230
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testimony about confidence is not relevant unless the witness is
expressing a lack of confidence.238
DNA evidence has provided a lens through which the justice system
can conclusively look at the past thirty years and evaluate the flaws in
eyewitness identification jurisprudence.239 But one question still remains
even with these much needed reforms instituted by New Jersey: In the
future, how will judges and attorneys know if New Jersey’s approach is
working?240 The “success” of an identification hearing depends on your
point of view: The defense attorney is advocating for suppression of the
identification while the prosecutor is arguing for its admissibility.
Regardless of how you define success, New Jersey’s decision is a step in
the right direction, because it solidifies the rights of criminal defendants,
holds law enforcement accountable, and provides jurors with much
needed information to make an accurate decision.241
IV. CONTRIBUTION
As discussed in Part III, New Jersey should not have incorporated all
five factors from the Supreme Court’s Biggers test because two of these
factors are based on the witness’s self-reporting.242 The New Jersey
Supreme Court’s decision to adopt degree of attention and eyewitness
confidence prolongs the life of two factors, which really have no
objective value.243 However, a model approach would take into account
police suggestiveness, incorporate reliable scientific evidence, and
exclude outdated factors utilized by the Supreme Court.244
Consequently, this Note urges states to adopt the prescribed model
approach, similar to what was adopted in New Jersey, so that states will
have a more objective and reliable method of analyzing an eyewitness
identification.245

238
See supra notes 57–59 and accompanying text (considering confidence as a factor and
concluding that confidence has very little correlation with accuracy when a witness is
expressing a high level of confidence).
239
See supra note 152 (suggesting that 250 DNA exonerations should serve as a reminder
that the current Manson test is not working).
240
Henderson, 27 A.3d at 922 (“We recognize that scientific research relating to the
reliability of eyewitness evidence is dynamic; the field is very different today than it was in
1977, and it will likely be quite different thirty years from now.”).
241
Id. at 878.
242
See supra Part III.C.3.
243
Steblay, supra note 126, at 471.
244
See infra Part IV.A–C (suggesting that a modified version of New Jersey’s test will
accomplish these aims).
245
See id. (modeling after New Jersey’s decision but revising two of the Biggers factors).
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A. Some Evidence of Suggestiveness Triggers a Pre-trial Wade Hearing
The first step in the model judicial reasoning is to determine whether
there is some evidence of suggestiveness at a pretrial hearing.246 To
determine this, courts should consider whether:
(1) a blind
administrator performed the line-up procedure; (2) the administrator
instructed the witness that “the suspect may not be present in the lineup
and [you] should not feel compelled to make an identification;” (3) the
line-up was constructed with at least five fillers who were similar in
appearance to the suspect; (4) the witness received any confirmatory
feedback; (5) the witness viewed the suspect multiple times; (6) the
police administered a show-up identification with instructions that the
individual in custody may or may not be the perpetrator; (7) the witness
chose any other suspect before choosing the alleged perpetrator; and (8)
any other relevant factors influenced the identification.247 Up to this
point, the defense may not introduce any evidence pertaining to
estimator variables.248
These hearings may become burdensome if every trial with an
eyewitness identification must first hold a pretrial hearing. However, if
at any time during the hearing the judge in his discretion determines that
the defendant has provided no evidence of suggestiveness or is wasting
the court’s time, he may terminate the hearing.249 Once the court has
concluded that the defendant has not offered any credible evidence of
suggestiveness, the defendant may not introduce any evidence
pertaining to estimator variables.250 Thus, even though in many
instances these pretrial hearings add an extra step in a judicial
proceeding, a court need not waste its time listening to baseless claims.251
If the defendant persuades the court that some evidence of
suggestiveness was present, the burden shifts to the State to show that
the identification was nevertheless reliable.252 During this phase of the
hearing, both the prosecutor and defense may offer estimator variables
for the court’s consideration.253 The ultimate burden rests on the
defendant to show “a very substantial likelihood of irreparable
misidentification.”254
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
254
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Id. at 920–921.
Id. at 921.
Id.
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B. Consider All Relevant Estimator Variables During the Pretrial Hearing
Once the defendant has presented evidence of suggestiveness and
the court is persuaded that some part of the identification process was
suggestive, the court should consider all relevant estimator variables. 255
Variables a court should consider include: (1) the amount of stress
during the event; (2) whether a weapon was present and visible; (3) the
amount of time the witness had to observe the event; (4) the proximity of
the witness to the perpetrator; (5) the lighting and other characteristics
pertaining to the scene of the crime; (6) any distinguishing characteristics
of the perpetrator; (7) memory decay; and (8) race bias.256 A court should
not be discouraged from using some factors from the Biggers analysis,
such as the witness’s opportunity to view the criminal, the accuracy of
any prior descriptions of the perpetrator, and the time between the crime
and the confrontation even though, for the most part, these three factors
are encompassed by other factors mentioned previously.257
However, courts should not consider the witness’s degree of
attention or the level of confidence demonstrated by the eyewitness
because these factors do not contribute anything that is not already taken
into account by the previous factors.258 Even assuming that the witness
has not received any feedback from law enforcement or private actors,
some people, because of personality, are more confident than others. In
addition, the confident eyewitness may be more likely to feel that he
paid adequate attention. Thus, a court should not consider these factors
when offered to establish the credibility of an eyewitness. However, in
its discretion, a court may consider these two factors when offered to
discredit a witness because, even though these factors are not indicia of
reliability, they do indicate a lack of reliability.
For example, imagine bystander X witnesses a crime and tells police
at a properly administered line-up, “I am absolutely positive that is the
man. I was standing in the bank when he robbed it.” Notwithstanding
X’s good intentions, other factors may have negatively influenced his
perception of the perpetrator, such as: whether the perpetrator had a
weapon visible, what kind of lighting the bank had, how close X was to
the perpetrator when he ran out, X’s degree of stress, how long it took
for the perpetrator to rob the bank, whether X was up against the wall or
on the ground, how long it took the police to respond, the perpetrator’s
race, and X’s disguise, if any. Certainly X felt as if he was paying close
Id. at 921.
Id.
257
Id. at 921–22.
258
See supra notes 57–58, 119 and accompanying text (explaining why these two factors
contribute very little to a court’s analysis of reliability).
255
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attention and may even feel confident as he tells police, but as explained
earlier in this Note, the scientific data confirms that both of these factors
are easily manipulated subconsciously by the existence of other factors.
Imagine the same situation, except that this time, when interviewed
by police, X admits that he was jamming to some tunes on his iPod, was
standing off to the side, and did not even know that a robbery was
occurring. At the line-up, X says that he is not sure if he identified the
right man. Both the fact that he was not paying close attention during
the commission of the crime and the fact that he is now uncertain of
whether he identified the correct man are incredibly relevant pieces of
information that a court should consider. Courts should consider all
relevant estimator variables during this stage excluding the witness’s
degree of attention and confidence unless those are offered to discredit
the eyewitness.
One of the appealing features of this approach is that courts may add
or delete factors as scientific research progresses.259 The flexibility of this
approach will place a substantial amount of discretion in the hands of
each individual state in order to determine which variables have gained
enough approval in the scientific arena to warrant consideration.260
C. Educate the Jurors at Trial
Once an identification passes through the pre-trial hearing and is
admitted into evidence, the jury needs to be educated about the variables
that affect memory.261 A judge should have the discretion to choose
whether experts testify or whether the judge should exclude experts in
lieu of jury instructions.262 The judge should take into account whether
both sides can afford to call experts, whether the jurors will be overly
influenced by an expert’s testimony, and whether the expert may invade
the jurors’ role by making a determination about an eyewitness’s
credibility.
This general approach, much like the one adopted by New Jersey,
will provide a flexible yet reliable guide to state courts when analyzing
an eyewitness identification. Courts must provide a pre-trial Wade
hearing when the defendant introduces some evidence of
suggestiveness; however, they should not consider an eyewitness’s
confidence and degree of attention when examining relevant estimator
variables. This approach recognizes the landmark contribution New
Jersey made to the legal community in its decision in Henderson but
259
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encourages states to go a little further by excluding two of the Biggers
factors when adopting a similar approach. New Jersey’s decision
represents a giant step in the right direction, but this Note’s amended
version of New Jersey’s approach will provide states with the model
reasoning necessary to create a more consistent framework for excluding
erroneous identifications.
V. CONCLUSION
The complexities involved in an eyewitness identification have been
largely unaddressed by most courts for over thirty years.263 This failure
is evidenced by the fact that seventy-five percent of individuals who
were exonerated by DNA evidence were incarcerated, at least in part,
due to an erroneous eyewitness identification.264 However, New Jersey
has provided a framework for other states and jurisdictions to follow, as
reform inevitably takes place across the United States. This new
approach accomplishes the goals Manson was meant to accomplish by
deterring police misconduct, incorporating reliable scientific data, and
accounting for jurors’ limitations.265 In addition, New Jersey’s model is
not overly burdensome on law enforcement or the judicial system as a
whole, protecting the competing interests of law enforcement,
prosecutors, and defense attorneys.
Unfortunately, New Jersey did not go far enough when it amended
its approach to eyewitness identification. By leaving intact two of the
Biggers factors, courts will continue to rely on two almost entirely
subjective factors in their analysis of whether an identification is reliable.
New Jersey has pioneered the way to a new and improved approach to
eyewitness identification, but other courts will do well to amend New
Jersey’s test by excluding eyewitness confidence and degree of attention
as estimator variables. Judges and juries will be able to reach a
determination of reliability without sifting through the subjectivity
implicit in these two factors.
Now, back to Marlon’s story. What if Illinois had adopted a version
of New Jersey’s approach before Marlon was arrested? Marlon’s story
may have ended differently. In its pre-trial hearing, the court noted that
the police had no reason to utilize a show-up identification instead of
placing Marlon in a typical line-up. Also, the officer failed to instruct
263
See supra Part II.B (summarizing the Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on eyewitness
identification).
264
See GARRETT, supra note 4 (studying the cases of 250 incarcerated individuals and
concluding that seventy-five percent were imprisoned partly due to an erroneous
identification).
265
Henderson, 27 A.3d at 921–23.
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Louis that Marlon may or may not be the suspect. After accepting these
facts as some evidence of suggestiveness, it went on to consider that: (1)
Louis was beaten by five or six individuals which inevitably resulted in a
considerable amount of stress; (2) the victim is a different race than the
attackers; (3) the entire event occurred over a span of only seconds or
minutes; (4) the attack happened at night; and (5) unconscious
transference may have caused Louis to confuse Marlon with one of his
attackers because Louis had previously noticed Marlon’s orange vest
while riding the train.
Although the court did not think these facts were enough to
suppress the identification altogether, the court crafted jury instructions
and informed the jury of the different dangers inherent in an
identification of this type. The judge even gave the defense attorney
permission to call an expert because of the precarious nature of the
identification in this case. Marlon’s case went to the jury and . . .
Marlon was given a fair trial. And a fair trial could have been the
beginning of a happy ending for at least 250 other individuals who were
wrongfully convicted because judges and juries were ill-equipped to
deal with the complexities of memory.
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